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 Every year, lawmakers and agency regulators, with the input of 
industry experts and scientists, make hundreds of decisions about how 
to regulate conduct and allocate resources to address various types of 
risks that threaten the well-being of American citizens.  In fact, 
managing and minimizing risk is one of the most important tasks of 
today’s policy makers.  In spite of this fact, policy makers often take 
action without their systematically considering the preferences of the 
very people whose welfare is at stake.  There are several reasons for 
this.  The dominance of traditional risk analysis, with its emphasis on 
statistics and cost-benefit analysis, has influenced policy makers to 
downplay the role of values and subjectivity in risk management.  The 
result has been that risk decisions have been based upon the 
erroneous assumption that empirical data and mathematical 
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calculations alone are adequate bases for risk decisions.  Rarely do 
decision makers acknowledge that ex ante consideration of public 
sentiment is valuable.  In fact, a number of scholars have argued that 
because individuals become emotional about potential harms, 
scientific experts should make all risk decisions without any public 
involvement at all.  A consequence of the focus on traditional risk 
analysis is that no one has developed a comprehensive model of 
public risk perception.  Existing theoretical perspectives and 
methodologies have not offered a comprehensive model, and each 
suffers from a limitation of one kind or another.  This Article argues 
that lawmakers cannot adequately manage risks without 
understanding how members of the public view and react to these 
risks.  In an effort to provide specific guidance for future risk 
decisions, the Article synthesizes past risk perception research and 
theory in order to offer a comprehensive risk perception model.  This 
model should serve as a tool for risk managers and policy makers and 
as a catalyst for future normative risk management debate. 
INTRODUCTION 
The interaction between risk events and social processes makes it 
clear that . . . risk has meaning only to the extent that it treats how 
people think about the world and its relationships.  Thus, there is no 
such thing as “true” (absolute) and “distorted” (socially determined) 
risk.  Rather the information system and characteristics of public 
responses that compose social amplification are essential elements 
in determining the nature and magnitude of risk.1 
Risk should be seen as a joint product of knowledge about the future 
and consent about the most desired prospects.2 
ach day, Americans live with risk management laws and policies 
formulated by lawmakers who lack the most basic understanding 
of how Americans view and react to these risks.  Although the United 
States was founded on the notion that individual citizens have the 
fundamental right to govern their own existence and make 
independent, informed choices, decisions about how to manage 
national security, pollutants in our water, speed limits, and health and 
safety standards in eating establishments and workplaces are decided 
by few on behalf of many.  The allocation of responsibility for such 
decisions to a particular group of individuals is inevitable; few would 
 
1 Roger E. Kasperson et al., The Social Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual 
Framework, 8 RISK ANALYSIS 177, 181 (1988). 
2 MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE 5 (1982). 
E
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argue that every public risk decision should be put to a vote of the 
people.  Nevertheless, decisions about how to manage risk—defined 
as the potential for harm from various sources—are inherently value-
laden judgment calls.  The very fact that risks are potential makes 
them unknowable, at least with any kind of certainty; their short- and 
long-term consequences are hard to gauge.  Because it is impossible 
to address and eliminate all risks simultaneously, difficult decisions 
must be made with respect to which pose the most significant threat 
and which negative consequences are the most terrible.  While expert 
analysis and prediction can give us best guesses as to how future 
events might unfold, expert analysis can neither anticipate human fear 
nor evaluate to determine objectively which of two harms with 
equivalent expected costs is worse.  This Article synthesizes past 
research and theory in the area of individual and public risk 
perception to derive a model of risk perception that may serve as a 
tool for risk managers and lawmakers in understanding how 
individuals think about, comprehend, and evaluate risks. 
Although daily life and governance3 involve myriad decisions, 
choices about how to respond to risks are some of the most important 
decisions human beings make.  From the home buyer evaluating the 
terms of a loan to the lawmaker deciding whether to vote for a 
declaration of war, individuals make risky decisions in a seemingly 
infinite variety of contexts.  Moreover, when evaluating the potential 
for future harm, the choices we make often have profound 
implications for future outcomes, including those affecting 
generations to come. 
Human comfort and survival are not the only considerations 
implicated by our choices.  Recently, there has been a growing 
awareness of how our actions impact the earth, air, water sources, and 
plant and animal life.  Risky decisions influence many facets of life 
and involve gauging outcomes that are difficult to predict, even with 
reasonably good data, making the wisdom of any particular course of 
action speculative.  And yet, it is impossible to avoid making these 
difficult choices.  Once a threat has been identified, failure to set a 
course of action is usually a choice in and of itself. 
 
3 “Simply put ‘governance’ means: the process of decision-making and the process by 
which decisions are implemented (or not implemented).”  What is Good Governance?, 
UNITED NATIONS ECON. & SOC. COMM’N FOR ASIA AND THE PACIFIC, 
http://www.unescap.org/pdd/prs/projectactivities/ongoing/gg/governance.asp (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2011). 
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Although there is an abundance of literature on how risks should be 
measured, managed, controlled, and calculated, surprising little has 
been written on how stakeholders—individuals who are affected by 
potential harms—evaluate and react to potential threats.  When risk 
management proposals are advanced, they are usually presented 
exclusively in terms of probabilities and costs.  To a great extent, 
factors exogenous to the conscious decision task, such as human 
emotion and cognitive processes, are ignored.  Decision tasks are 
treated as if there is a correct answer upon which all could agree, if 
only complete data were available.  Rarely is risk understood as a 
culturally defined force, interpreted by human beings who bring their 
own understandings and preferences to the table.  However, recent 
empirical and theoretical contributions from sociology, psychology, 
and anthropology make it clear that the very act of perceiving and 
evaluating a danger is a complex, multifaceted process.  Several 
theoretical and empirical perspectives on risk perception have been 
offered by influential thinkers such as Paul Slovic, Roger Kasperson, 
Baruch Fischhoff, Sarah Lichtenstein, Ulrich Beck, and Mary 
Douglas, among others.  Nevertheless, research on how individuals 
think about risk has failed to converge on a comprehensive model of 
risk perception.  In part, this failure has arisen because discussions 
have emphasized either the specific characteristics of the risks or the 
social mechanisms underlying public panics.  Analysis of the 
interaction of these two aspects of risk perception is sparse.4  
Although each of the various primary approaches to our investigating 
and understanding risk perception makes important contributions, to 
date, there has not been an attempt to draw wisdom from the 
collective scholarship.5 
This Article synthesizes the collective wisdom from psychology, 
sociology, anthropology, political science, and law to derive a model 
 
4 The exception is Kasperson et al., supra note 1, which is an important work but is 
subject to a number of shortcomings discussed infra Part I.  Another major work of great 
influence is PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF RISK (2000). 
5 Instead, commentators have attempted to compare and contrast various methodologies 
and theories in an effort to arrive at a consensus as to which of the approaches is most 
useful.  See, e.g., Claire Marris et al., A Quantitative Test of the Cultural Theory of Risk 
Perceptions: Comparison with the Psychometric Paradigm, 18 RISK ANALYSIS 635, 635 
(1998) (finding that “[t]he qualitative risk characteristics generated by the psychometric 
paradigm explained a far greater proportion of the variance in risk perceptions than 
cultural biases”); see also Lennart Sjöberg, Are Received Risk Perception Models Alive 
and Well?, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 665 (2002) (arguing that recent scholarship touting cultural 
and psychometric risk analysis approaches have been inappropriately optimistic about the 
approaches). 
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that includes the most important factors to consider in predicting how 
members of the public will evaluate risks.  A primary aim of this 
Article is to broaden and deepen the scope of our understanding of 
risk perception by synthesizing various risk perception theories.  
Ultimately, the goal is to create a single set of criteria that can be used 
to understand when, and under what conditions, human beings 
become concerned about particular risks.  The hope is that this model 
will serve as a tool for risk managers and a springboard for future 
normative discussion of public risk management. 
The Article proceeds in four parts.  Part I describes the current risk 
climate, noting the rising concern over modern risks created by 
advances in science and technology.  Part II explains the primary 
contributions to the risk perception literature, examining each of the 
major theoretical perspectives to date.  Part III draws on these existing 
perspectives to derive a list of the most important considerations for 
risk perception and introduces several new contributions.  Part IV 
addresses the major considerations from Part III, synthesizing the 
major work from Part II in order to provide a comprehensive model 
that includes risk-amplifying and attenuating factors.6  I conclude by 
proposing a risk-perception model illustrated by the following chart: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
6 The notion that risk can be amplified and attenuated was most prominently featured in 
the seminal paper authored by Roger Kasperson and colleagues, entitled, The Social 
Amplification of Risk: A Conceptual Framework, supra note 1. 
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I 
THE NATURE OF MODERN RISKS: WHY WE WORRY 
Policy makers and individual Americans make risk decisions on a 
daily, and sometimes even minute-to-minute, basis.  It is impossible 
to think about crime, the environment, food safety, foreign relations, 
medical research, consumer protection, traffic laws, economic policy, 
or food production without also thinking about risk.7  So much of law 
and policy is driven by current wisdom regarding risk management, 
that much of the time, risk management considerations are implicit in 
the debate.  Risk decisions are never value neutral: they are 
determined by preferences, shaped by affective reactions, and 
influenced by cognitive and cultural biases, although that is not 
always acknowledged.  Engaging in the metacognition necessary in 
order to understand human threat responses can be uncomfortable. 
Arguably, this uneasiness explains why so much of risk analysis relies 
on formulaic cost-benefit analysis while avoiding fundamental 
questions about how our risk responses satisfy human emotional and 
intellectual requirements. 
In addition to psychological obstacles, fluctuations in the risk 
landscape cause challenges to risk managers and the lay public alike.  
The most significant obstacles facing human beings have changed 
over time as our resources and technologies have evolved.  As Paul 
Slovic has pointed out: 
In recent decades, the profound development of chemical and 
nuclear technologies has been accompanied by the potential to 
cause catastrophic and long-lasting damage to the earth and the life 
forms that inhabit it.  The mechanisms underlying these complex 
technologies are unfamiliar and incomprehensible to most citizens.  
Their most harmful consequences are rare and often delayed, hence 
difficult to assess by statistical analysis and not well suited to 
management by trial-and-error learning.8 
 
7 See John D. Graham, Historical Perspective on Risk Assessment in the Federal 
Government, 102 TOXICOLOGY 29, 33–35 (1995) (explaining that carcinogens 
traditionally have been seen to lack safety “thresholds” and describing how this no-
threshold view prompted regulatory agencies to adopt “individual risk” tests); Dennis J. 
Paustenbach, Retrospective on U.S. Health Risk Assessment: How Others Can Benefit, 6 
RISK: HEALTH, SAFETY & ENV’T 283, 284 (1995) (“[O]ver 300 of about 5,000 chemicals 
routinely used in industry have been labeled carcinogens as a result of animal studies.”); 
see also Lynn J. Frewer et al., Communicating About the Risks and Benefits of Genetically 
Modified Foods: The Mediating Role of Trust, 23 RISK ANALYSIS 1117 (2003). 
8 Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 280 (1987). 
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The German sociologist Ulrich Beck notes that we have moved from 
a culture of scarcity to a culture of risk.9  Today, in Western societies, 
more people than ever before have their basic needs met.10  Since the 
early 1900s, an increase in resources devoted to researching and 
developing medicines, methods of food production, and novel 
synthetics have dramatically increased the standard of living for 
most.11  In the United States, citizens benefit tremendously from 
innovative technologies, some of which not only improve the quality 
of life, but also extend our lives and improve our health.  These 
technologies, however, come with associated risks, some of which are 
devastating and many of which are not discovered until after a 
technology has gained general acceptance and widespread use.  The 
focus has shifted from concern about a lack of resources to the 
promulgation of dangers in medicines, food sources, the environment, 
and consumer products.12  America, along with other Western 
cultures, has arguably become risk obsessed.13  Commentators have 
noted the prevalence of fear in our culture.14  Political scientist Aaron 
Wildavsky famously remarked, “How extraordinary!  The richest, 
longest-lived, best-protected, most resourceful civilization, with the 
highest degree of insight into its own technology, is on its way to 
becoming the most frightened.”15 
 
9 See ULRICH BECK, RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY 26 (1992). 
10 See Kenneth E. Boulding et al., From Abundance to Scarcity: Implications for the 
American Tradition, THE HAMMOND LECT. SER. (1978) (“[T]he developed countries of 
North America, Europe, Japan, and Australia clearly consume considerably more than half 
of these resources, but they have less than a quarter of the world's population.”). 
11 See Stephen D. Oliner & Daniel E. Sichel, The Resurgence of Growth in the Late 
1990s: Is Information Technology the Story?, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 3, 4 (2000). 
12 See BECK, supra note 9, at 19. 
13 See David L. Altheide, The News Media, the Problem Frame, and the Production of 
Fear, 38 SOC. Q. 647, 664–65 (1997).  Altheide notes, 
 The perception of many is that life is very problematic, dangerous, and 
demanding of extreme measures to protect us.  Indeed, one of the few things 
Americans seem to share is the popular culture that celebrates danger and fear as 
entertainment organized with canned formats delivered through an inexpensive 
and invasive information technology. 
 Private life is closer to public concerns and issues than ever before.  This is 
because both wear the look of popular culture.  And this looks like fear. 
Id. 
14 See generally H. AARON COHL, ARE WE SCARING OURSELVES TO DEATH?: HOW 
PESSIMISM, PARANOIA, AND A MISGUIDED MEDIA ARE LEADING US TOWARD DISASTER 
(1997). 
15 Aaron Wildavsky, No Risk Is the Highest Risk of All, 67 AM. SCIENTIST 32, 32 
(1979). 
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If Americans seem paralyzed with fear, it may be because of the 
nature of the risks we face today.  Increasingly, the American 
populace perceives that it is at risk from an onslaught of potential 
dangers that threaten health and well-being.16  Whereas famine, 
disease, and natural disasters plagued past generations of human 
beings, today’s populations face increasingly diverse threats.  The 
development of myriad novel technologies, along with often lagging 
understanding of the full complement of accompanying 
consequences, means that society is often fully engaged with a 
product or process before discovering its risks.17  Threats to health 
and well-being are often difficult to detect, being invisible to the 
naked eye, odorless and tasteless, or originating in a distant 
location.18  Moreover, the impact of some of the harms we face today, 
such as nuclear weapons and environmental degradation, are 
profound and far-reaching—to the next generation and beyond.19  
Beck notes that “in the modernization process, more and more 
destructive forces are also being unleashed, forces before which the 
human imagination stands in awe.”20  The evolution of science and 
technology, and our shifting focus from production of goods to 
protection of health and environment, has brought a new awareness of 
risk in individuals.  Individuals are more aware of risks, think more 
about them, engage in more self-education, have more opinions about 
 
16 See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2, at 2, 44 (1987) (citing Louis Harris & 
Associates, Risk in a Complex Society (public opinion survey conducted by Marsh & 
McLennan Companies, New York, 1979)).  These data are clearly outdated, but more 
recent data suggest a continuing trend in a similar direction.  See also Jonathan Simon, 
Risk and Reflexivity: What Socio-Legal Studies Add to the Study of Risk and the Law, 57 
ALA. L. REV. 119, 121–22 (2005) (discussing some historical examples of how Americans 
have become inflamed with fear over one risk or another). 
17 See Slovic, supra note 8. 
18 See Roger E. Kasperson & Jeanne X. Kasperson, The Social Amplification and 
Attenuation of Risk, 545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 96 (1996). 
The familiar scourges of famine, disease, and pestilence no longer dominate the 
risk experience, which, instead, now involved negotiating a new and perplexing 
array of global threats associated with modern armaments, chemicals and 
radiation often invisible to the senses, contaminants whose effects surface only 
after decades or generations, hazards created by peoples and technologies in 
distant parts of the globe, and harms arising from the flow and control of 
information. 
Id. 
19 See BECK, supra note 9, at 22 (“Atomic accidents are accidents no more in the 
limited sense of the word ‘accident’.  They outlast generations.” (internal parenthetical 
omitted)). 
20 Id. at 19. 
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them, are more emotionally and financially invested in managing risk, 
and therefore desire to and ought to have an increasing role in 
deciding how large-scale risk decisions are made. 
Given our culture of anxiety, continuing in our current state of 
relative ignorance about how members of society perceive risk will 
have at least two negative implications.  The first implication is that, 
as things stand, law and policy makers are seriously flawed in their 
predictions about how members of the public will react to risks.  The 
result is that the public is increasingly disenchanted with government, 
distrustful of industry, and scornful of politicians’ reassurances.  
Disillusionment has a variety of negative consequences, ranging from 
apathy at the polls to civil unrest.  Moreover, suspicion of the various 
decision-making bodies entrusted with the safety and well-being of 
the citizenry results in fear, and a fearful public is more easily 
manipulated and controlled by actors who use divisive and destructive 
tactics.21 
The second implication of maintaining the ignorance about risk 
perception is that without input from members of the public, decisions 
made for members of the public will inevitably be flawed.22  Risk 
calculations—such as which benefits are outweighed by which 
risks—are judgment calls and are invariably subjective.  Accordingly, 
decisions by a few on behalf of many, without consideration for the 
preferences of those affected, are a form of tyranny.  Good 
governance requires inclusivity. 
Some have argued that the public is ill-equipped to make valid 
assessments about risk because average citizens are prone to cognitive 
error and bias.23  Law scholar Donald Hornstein strenuously rejects 
this argument as a basis for limiting the role of the public in risk 
decisions.  Hornstein points out that scientists themselves are subject 
to inevitable uncertainties, flawed methods, and industry bias.24  He 
further argues that subordination of public views to governmental risk 
 
21 Christina E. Wells, Questioning Deference, 69 MO. L. REV. 903, 929 (2004) (“[T]he 
public may fall prey to skewed risk assessment as a result of private availability 
entrepreneurs’ attempts to fan fear regarding particular threats.”). 
22 The argument that personal preferences about risk have value and must be part of the 
risk decision quotient is made in substantially greater detail infra Part III. 
23 That members of the public are prone to mistakes during decision tasks is a theme of 
law scholar Cass Sunstein’s work.  See, e.g., Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability 
Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999). 
24 Donald T. Hornstein, Reclaiming Environmental Law: A Normative Critique of 
Comparative Risk Analysis, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 562, 610–16 (1992). 
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assessments is undemocratic.25  Finally, Hornstein stresses that there 
are rational bases for citizens’ risk evaluations; even when they might 
not comport with statistical probabilities, they reflect legitimate 
personal preferences.26 
II 
CURRENT THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON RISK RESPONSE 
The comprehensive model of risk perception offered in this Article 
draws on the major risk perception theories developed thus far.  These 
theories or methodologies include traditional risk analysis, 
psychometric study of risk perception, social amplification of risk 
theory, availability cascade theory, and the cultural evaluator theory.  
Each theoretical perspective adds an important set of considerations 
and is worthy of inclusion in the final model.  Some of these 
approaches have important shortcomings.  Others make significant 
contributions but do not go far enough toward elucidating a predictive 
model. 
The oldest and most influential approach is traditional risk 
analysis.  This approach is distinctly expert-centered, relies upon 
statistical and mathematical calculations, and involves cost-benefit 
analysis.27  More recently, the psychometric method—an individual-
centered approach to risk evaluation—was pioneered by Baruch 
Fischhoff, Paul Slovic, Sarah Lichtenstein, Stephen Read, and 
Barbara Combs.28  These scholars, along with their colleagues, 
solicited the opinions of ordinary Americans regarding various 
sources of risk and attempted to make generalizations about what 
 
25 Id. at 611–12. 
26 Id. at 610–16.  This view is similar to that of Dan Kahan.  See Dan M. Kahan, Two 
Conceptions of Emotion in Risk Regulation, 156 U. PA. L. REV. 741 (2008); see also 
discussion infra Part II.E. 
27 Cost-benefit analysis can be defined as “a strategy for choice in which weightings are 
allocated to the available alternatives, arriving at some kind of aggregate figure for each 
major option.”  Martha C. Nussbaum, The Costs of Tragedy: Some Moral Limits of Cost-
Benefit Analysis, in COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS: LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND PHILOSOPHICAL 
PERSPECTIVES 169, 192 (Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner eds., 2001); see also 
Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis: Definition, Justification, and Comment on 
Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153 (2000) (“The term ‘cost-benefit 
analysis’ has a variety of meanings and uses.  At the highest level of generality, . . . it is 
virtually synonymous with welfare economics, that is, economics used normatively—used, 
that is, to provide guidance for the formation of policy, either public . . . or private.” 
(internal citation omitted)). 
28 See Baruch Fischhoff et al., How Safe Is Safe Enough? A Psychometric Study of 
Attitudes Towards Technological Risks and Benefits, 9 POL. SCI. 127, 128 (1978). 
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characteristics of risk cause people particular concern.  A decade after 
the seminal psychometric paper, Roger Kasperson joined with Ortwin 
Renn, Slovic, and several others to develop a new model that included 
the dynamic processes of risk communication and interpretation.  The 
result, social amplification of risk (SAR), predicted that individuals 
would experience increasing (amplifying) or decreasing (attenuating) 
concern depending upon potential for events to trigger concern over 
possible future harm. 
A related but fundamentally normative explanation of risk 
perception, advanced by Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein, explained 
public panics as a result of availability cascades.29  Availability 
cascades, according to Kuran and Sunstein, result when cognitively 
available (easily accessible) examples of an outcome lead people to 
overestimate the prevalence of a risk or the likelihood of a negative 
outcome.30  Social discourse can exacerbate this phenomenon, 
creating a “snowball” effect that results in growing concern among 
members of the public.  Kuran and Sunstein use their theory to call 
for a smaller role for the public in risk management and to advocate 
for an even larger role for the expert in risk decisions. 
Dan Kahan’s cultural evaluator model, on the other hand, draws on 
the work of Mary Douglas, who viewed emotional (i.e., nonrational) 
reactions to risk as manifestations of culturally shaped (and valuable) 
expressions of underlying worldviews.  Kahan, like Hornstein, 
advocates a greater role for individual preferences in risk 
management.  The following subsections discuss traditional risk 
analysis, availability cascades, and the cultural evaluator model in 
more detail. 
A.  Traditional Risk Analysis 
The most influential approach to risk management has been, and 
remains, traditional risk analysis.  The broad influence of this expert-
centered, data-driven methodology is one reason why the role of 
public opinion in formal risk management has been marginalized.  
Traditional risk analysis (also referred to as “risk management”) can 
be defined as “the identification, assessment, and prioritization 
followed by coordinated and economical application of resources to 
minimize, monitor, and control the probability and/or impact of 
 
29 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 703. 
30 Id. at 683. 
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unfortunate events.”31  Traditional risk analysis has been conceived of 
as a method for determining an appropriate response on a large-scale 
to widespread or catastrophic risk.32 
Traditional risk analysis has been used widely and applied to gauge 
risk in the areas of business enterprise, systems management, 
insurance, health epidemics, and military operations, to name a few.  
Depending upon the project or set of circumstances, the goals may 
vary somewhat, though the method tends to be consistent.33  Within 
this methodology, attempts have been made to create international 
standards by which risk can be assessed and managed.34 
Traditional risk analysis has relied on a purportedly value-neutral 
formula: [probability of risk occurring] x [cost associated with that 
risk event].35  The formula-based approach focuses largely on hazards 
related to new technologies, environmental degradation, and public 
health.36  It was, and still is, “distinctly ‘expert-centered’ and 
uncomfortable with (or even hostile to) considering the views of 
 
31 DOUGLAS W. HUBBARD, THE FAILURE OF RISK MANAGEMENT: WHY IT’S BROKEN 
AND HOW TO FIX IT 10 (2009). 
32 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 14 (2004) 
(advocating the use of cost-benefit analysis by regulators when shaping responses to 
catastrophic risk). 
33 The methodology involves the following steps: (1) identify, characterize, and assess 
threats; (2) assess the vulnerability of critical assets; (3) determine the consequences (i.e., 
the risk); (4) identify ways to reduce those risks; and (5) prioritize risk reduction measures 
based on a strategy.  INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, COMMITTEE DRAFT OF ISO 
31000 RISK MANAGEMENT—GUIDELINES ON PRINCIPLES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RISK 
MANAGEMENT (2007). 
34 For example, the International Organization for Standardization has codified a family 
of standards relating to risk called ISO 31000. INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, ISO 
31000:2009 RISK MANAGEMENT—PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES (2009).  The purpose of 
ISO 31000:2009 is to provide principles and generic guidelines on risk management.  See 
id. 
35 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 177.  The formula parallels one side of the well-
known Coase Theorem, expressed as B < PL, and famously cited by Judge Learned Hand 
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in his decision, United States v. Carroll Towing 
Co., 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947).  The Coase Theorem represents an efficiency equation 
in which B is the burden of prevention, P is the probability of loss, and L is the cost of the 
loss.  Optimal efficiency is reached when prevention is taken only if the cost of prevention 
is less than PL.  Importantly, this formula works when the losses are pecuniary.  Important 
ethical considerations arise when the losses involve human life or health. 
36 See Gary E. Machlis & Eugene A. Rosa, Desired Risk: Broadening the Social 
Amplification of Risk Framework, 10 RISK ANALYSIS 161, 161 (1989) (arguing that one 
important—but oft neglected—aspect of risk behavior is that of risks that people freely 
assume). 
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diverse, nonexpert parties.”37  Risks are defined as the chance of 
physical harm (to person, property, or element of the natural world) 
due to technologies, diseases, or other mechanisms.38  This definition 
excludes explicit consideration of affect- or value-based reactions to 
risk. 
Traditional risk analysis is not without its critics.  Some of the 
criticism has focused on the method’s overreliance on basic methods 
and formulas that lack predictive power.39  However, there is a more 
fundamental issue relating to the inputs: traditional risk analysis gives 
little or no consideration to the human element; the analysis either 
ignores or substantially underemphasizes public sentiment regarding 
potential threats.40  This feature of risk analysis means that policy 
makers are (1) unable to predict how members of society will view 
specific dangers as the threats become salient to the public and (2) ill-
equipped to craft responses to risk that take into account public fear of 
these hazards.41  In other words, as Kasperson, Renn, and Slovic have 
noted, “the technical concept of risk is too narrow and ambiguous to 
serve as the crucial yardstick for policy making.”42  Beck similarly 
worries that as long as the debate is “conducted exclusively or 
dominantly in the terms and formulas of natural science” the danger 
 
37 Paul Slovic, Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk 
Assessment Battlefield, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 59, 98 (1997). 
38 Scott Lash & Brian Wynne, Introduction to BECK, supra note 9, at 4. 
39 See, e.g., HUBBARD, supra note 31, at 46. 
40 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 177. 
41 Proposed characteristics of effective risk management have attempted to account for 
the human element, but only in a reactive, rather than a responsive and interactive, fashion.  
The proposed characteristics are as follows: 
(1) Risk management should create value; 
(2) Risk management should be an integral part of organizational processes; 
(3) Risk management should be part of decision making; 
(4) Risk management should explicitly address uncertainty; 
(5) Risk management should be systematic and structured; 
(6) Risk management should be based on the best available information; 
(7) Risk management should be tailored; 
(8) Risk management should take into account human factors; 
(9) Risk management should be transparent and inclusive; 
(10) Risk management should be dynamic, iterative, and responsive to change; 
and 
(11) Risk management should be capable of continual improvement and 
enhancement. 
INT’L ORG. FOR STANDARDIZATION, supra note 34, at 2. 
42 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178. 
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exists that the “terms will inadvertently include human beings in the 
picture only as organic material” and that “it runs the risk of 
atrophying into a discussion of nature without people, without asking 
about matters of social and cultural significance.”43 
Another layer of complexity in this discussion stems from the fact 
that harms often accompany technologies, processes, or products that 
have important benefits.  The value placed on these benefits can 
fluctuate so that even if the evaluation of associated benefits and 
harms stays constant, tolerance for the risk may change.  Particularly, 
as novel technologies develop making other technologies obsolete, 
this balance of benefit and harm is ever evolving.  This aspect of 
modern risk analysis is another reason why some have argued that it 
is not appropriate for risk experts, who might not have a clear sense of 
the current value of a particular technology to the public at large, to 
be the exclusive determiners of the relative risk of various 
technologies.44 
B.  Psychometric Study of Risk Perception 
The psychometric study of risk was a response to traditional risk 
analysis.  Risk-benefit is a method of analysis that asks, “Is this 
product (activity, technology) acceptably safe?  Alternatively, how 
safe is safe enough?”45  Baruch Fischhoff along with Paul Slovic and 
colleagues believed that the risk-benefit analysis was inadequate for 
answering those questions.46  Fischhoff and Slovic were particularly 
critical of one proposed justification for risk-benefit analysis, called 
“revealed preferences.”  Revealed preferences is based upon the 
assumption that through trial and error society has determined an 
optimum level of risk for a given activity.47  Hence, the existing risk-
benefit balance is appropriate, and there is no need to take a separate, 
empirical measure of individuals’ risk preferences.  The primary 
criticism of revealed preferences is that it ignores the fact that 
 
43 BECK, supra note 9, at 24.  Although some cost-benefit risk analysts who have 
traditionally focused on economic issues have started to raise relevant questions about risk 
perception and preferences, they have done little to answer these questions.  See Ian 
Savage, An Empirical Investigation into the Effect of Psychological Perceptions on the 
Willingness-to-Pay to Reduce Risk, 6 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 75, 76 (1993). 
44 For a discussion of the cultural evaluator theory of risk perception, see infra Part I.E. 
45 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28. 
46 The work with which Fischhoff, Slovic, and colleagues took issue is Chauncey 
Starr’s Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232 (1969). 
47 Id. at 1232. 
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society’s preferences fluctuate.48  Revealed preferences also assumes 
that the market correctly reflects the optimal risk level and discounts 
the possibility that the public is accepting a risk because the public is 
ignorant of the potential for harm or the potential for elimination of 
harm.49 
Fischhoff and colleagues proposed a surprisingly little-used 
method of ascertaining the “acceptability” of risk—they asked people 
questions.50  The goal was to derive a “cognitive map,”51 or a 
taxonomy, for hazards that could serve as a tool for understanding and 
predicting risk responses.52  Psychometric researchers hoped to 
explain “people’s extreme aversion to some hazards, their 
indifference to others, and the discrepancies between these reactions 
and opinions of experts.”53  The initial method and the results were 
presented in Fischhoff’s 1978 empirical paper.  Although the 
methodology was not without drawbacks,54 the work represented a 
breakthrough in risk analysis, turning focus toward the perceptions 
and priorities of members of the public rather than focusing 
exclusively on formulas or experts to determine acceptable risks and 
risk levels. 
C.  The Social Amplification of Risk Theory 
If the psychometric study of risk perception was a breakthrough, 
the SAR theory advanced the field further, building on the previous 
work by adding social, cultural, and other dynamic aspects of risk 
perception to the equation.55  In 1988, Roger Kasperson and his 
colleagues introduced the SAR framework, which sought to describe 
active and interactive forces through which risk perceptions are 
amplified and attenuated.56  SAR included additional influences not 
 
48 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28, at 129. 
49 See id. at 128. 
50 See id. at 127. 
51 See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in THE PERCEPTION OF RISK, supra note 4, at 
222. 
52 See Slovic, supra note 8. 
53 Paul Slovic & Elke U. Weber, Perception of Risk Posed by Extreme Events 7 (paper 
presented at “Risk Management Strategies in an Uncertain World,” Palisades, N.Y., Apr. 
12–13, 2002). 
54 For example, the respondents were all women and were all members of the League of 
Women voters.  For a variety of reasons, this group is not likely to be representative of 
society as a whole. 
55 See generally Kasperson et al., supra note 1. 
56 See id. 
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accounted for by traditional risk analysis.  Like the psychometric 
model, SAR accounts for characteristics of a hazard that influence the 
public’s response to risk, including whether the public assumed the 
risk voluntarily, the public’s familiarity with the source of the danger, 
and the potential for catastrophe.57  In addition, SAR includes 
consideration of cultural factors, such as those affecting the priorities 
and agendas of various societal subgroups, the associated efforts to 
influence risk responses, and social aspects, including the impacts of 
information communication.58  Hence, SAR is concerned with more 
than cost-benefit analysis or individual preference; this theory 
includes factors that implicate ethical and normative considerations. 
The SAR concept envisions a flexible feedback system in which 
social perceptions of risks influence behaviors, which then impact 
responses to risk, which in turn influence the public’s view of the 
risk.59  In addition to the more comprehensive framework provided by 
SAR, the theory makes several particularly valuable contributions to 
the field of risk analysis.  In short, SAR posits that “risk events 
interact with psychological, social, and cultural processes in ways that 
can heighten or attenuate public perceptions of risk and related risk 
behavior . . . [and that] behavioral patterns in turn generate secondary 
social or economic consequences . . . [and] may act also to increase or 
decrease the physical risk itself.”60 
1.  Amplification Mechanisms 
SAR identifies “amplification stations” and steps whereby, either 
through direct experience or by learning from other sources, 
individuals develop heightened sensitivity to various risks.61  
Kasperson and colleagues describe this process at the message and 
signal levels.  At the message level, SAR proposes that individuals 
automatically parse the communication into factual information, 
 
57 See id.; Machlis & Rosa, supra note 36, at 164. 
58 See Arie Rip, Should Social Amplification of Risk Be Counteracted?, 8 RISK 
ANALYSIS 193, 196 (1988).  See generally Kasperson et al., supra note 1. 
59 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178 (admitting that other scholars have written in a 
less comprehensive fashion about the dynamic social aspect of risk analysis); see Brian 
Wynne, Public Perceptions of Risk, in THE URBAN TRANSPORTATION OF IRRADIATED 
FUEL 246 (John Surrey ed., 1984).  See generally THE SOCIAL AND CULTURAL 
CONSTRUCTION OF RISK (Branden B. Johnson & Vincent T. Covello eds., 1987). 
60 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178; see also Nick Pidgeon, Risk 
Communication and the Social Amplification of Risk: Theory, Evidence and Policy 
Implications, 4 RISK DECISION & POL’Y 145, 146 (1999). 
61 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 184; see also Pidgeon, supra note 60, at 147. 
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inferential messages, and conclusions, the formation of which 
depends upon which cultural symbols and values are implicated.62  In 
addition to the content of the message, the number of times the 
message is repeated may affect judgments about accuracy.63  At the 
signal level, scientists, the media, political organizers, public 
agencies, and other interested individuals and groups generate and 
communicate information about the potential for harm.64  Recipients 
of the information filter and decode the signals that they receive and 
ultimately interpret and often communicate that information to others, 
forming conclusions in the process.65 
2.  Second- and Third-Order Impacts 
Once recipients have interpreted the information, bringing personal 
experience and value judgments to bear in the process, the recipients 
manifest behavioral responses.  These responses can involve attempts 
to change the status quo, including pressuring policy makers, altering 
personal behavioral patterns, communicating attitudes to others in the 
community, and engaging in related consumer behavior.66  These 
behavioral responses result in secondary impacts, which, according to 
Kasperson and colleagues, include impacts on business sales, 
modifications in training of emergency personnel, protesting or other 
forms of social unrest, changes in regulatory standards, and political 
and social pressure.67 
3.  Information Channels 
In addition to describing outcomes, social amplification theory also 
seeks to explain the characteristics of information flow and how 
patterns of social exchange and the very nature of communication can 
impact perceptions of risk.  SAR identifies four aspects of 
communication about risk that can affect risk judgments: the volume 
of information about the risk, the degree to which the information is 
controversial, the sensationalistic nature of the information, and the 
 
62 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 180. 
63 Id.; see also Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96; Pidgeon, supra note 60, at 
147. 
64 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 181. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 182; see also Pidgeon, supra note 60, at 147 (explaining that some events will 
lead to spreading “ripples” of secondary consequences that go beyond the initial impact of 
the event); Machlis & Rosa, supra note 36, at 163. 
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“symbolic connotations” inherent in the information.68  Several of 
these characteristics implicate certain previously discussed so-called 
amplification stations.  For example, the media’s interest in a 
particular risk is likely to result in repeated, highly sensationalized 
reports that increase the public’s attention to the risk.69 
Social amplification theory is primarily focused on risk 
amplification, but the theory does provide some insight into factors 
that will tend to result in risk attenuation.70  One example is an 
individual’s direct, personal experience with a particular risk.  
Although direct experience can serve to amplify risk judgments, such 
as when a hazard leaves an indelible memory because of its vivid 
nature, amplification is not the only possible result of direct 
experience.71  Familiarity with a risky activity can sometimes result in 
statistically low-risk calculations, as is the case when drivers are 
asked the likelihood of serious injury or death resulting from the 
operation of an automobile.72 
4.  Features of the Social Environment 
Recipients of information about risks have characteristics that help 
to determine how they will receive and process the information.  For 
example, human beings are limited in their ability to analyze and store 
information.  As a result, humans rely on cognitive rules of thumb, or 
heuristics, when they process information.73  Although the use of 
heuristics is often helpful, it can also result in misleading or biased 
judgments.74  Cultural values, like heuristics, shape the lens through 
 
68 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 184. 
69 Id. (pointing out that repeated coverage of a particular hazard can result in public 
“scares”). 
70 See William J. Burns et al., Incorporating Structural Models into Research on the 
Social Amplification of Risk: Implications for Theory Construction and Decision Making, 
13 RISK ANALYSIS 611 (1993) (developing structural models to explain how the impact 
upon society of an accident is influenced by several factors, including the physical 
consequences of the event, perceived risk, media coverage, and public response). 
71 See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. 
72 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 184 (“Generally, experience with dramatic 
accidents or risk events increases the memorability and imaginability of the hazard, 
thereby heightening the perception of risk.  But direct experience can also . . . afford[] 
better perspective and enhanced capacity for avoiding risks.”). 
73 Heuristics and biases are discussed in greater detail infra Part II. 
74 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 185 (citing JUDGMENT UNDER UNCERTAINTY: 
HEURISTICS AND BIASES (Daniel Kahneman et al. eds., 1982)). 
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which information is evaluated and assimilated, helping to determine 
which dangers are given high priority.75 
Timing becomes important when the political landscape 
encourages posturing around real or perceived dangers to public 
welfare.  When subgroups within society hold opposing views on 
issues, SAR theory predicts that a risk “will be vigorously brought to 
more general public attention . . . [and p]olarization of views and 
escalation of rhetoric by partisans typically occur and new recruits are 
drawn into the conflicts.”76  Kasperson and colleagues also claim that 
the “signal” sent by a risk event and the “stigma” associated with 
certain locations or processes can influence risk perception.77 
This type of polarization and galvanization around an issue or 
event is a typical phenomenon in politics, particularly in our two-
party system.  Discontent over the state of the economy, financial 
markets, the housing market, and unemployment generally caused 
deep divisions following a series of events occurring between 2007 
and 2010.  The precipitous fall of the housing market, starting in 
2006,78 proved disastrous for countless Americans, many of whom 
lost their jobs and ultimately their homes in the ensuing financial 
meltdown.79  According to the social amplification of risk theory, the 
economic downturn served as a signal, shaping how Americans 
viewed subsequent events.  Subsequent events, such as the 
government bailout of struggling financial institutions, the 
implementation of the Troubled Asset Relief Program80 (signed into 
law by President George W. Bush on October 3, 2008), the election of 
 
75 See id.  An example of just such a value is the notion that society’s children are 
worthy of special protection because they are uniquely vulnerable members of society and 
because they are the “future” or our civilization.  This sentiment would result in a higher 
level of concern over risks that could negatively impact young members of society. 
76 See id. 
77 The inclusion of “signal value” and “stigmatization,” while helpful and relevant to 
predicting and understanding public reactions to risk, do not fit particularly well under the 
rubric of social environmental factors.  Ambiguity in how to categorize various SAR 
factors is one drawback of the theory. 
78 According to one report, “A variety of experts now say, the housing industry appears 
to be moving from a boom to something that is starting to look a lot like a bust.”  Jeremy 
W. Peters, Sales Slow for Homes New and Old, N.Y. TIMES, July 26, 2006, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/26/business/26home.html?_r=1&oref=login&ref 
=business&pagewanted=print. 
79 See Press Release, Cambridge Energy Research Assocs., Three Top Economists 
Agree 2009 Worst Financial Crisis Since Great Depression (Feb. 29, 2009), available at 
http://www2.cera.com/news/details/1,2318,10119,00.html. 
80 For more on the Troubled Asset Relief Program, see http://www.federalreserve.gov 
/bankinforeg/tarpinfo.htm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
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Barack Obama to the presidency one month later, and Obama’s 
subsequent push for health care reform were evaluated in terms of the 
ongoing crisis, fueling the anxiety of those already apprehensive 
about threats to their financial security.  With fear as a powerful 
catalyst, citizens became increasingly nervous and divided. 
As noted by the Pew Research Center in April 2010, “By almost 
every conceivable measure Americans are less positive and more 
critical of government these days.”81  The Pew survey concluded that 
“a perfect storm of conditions associated with distrust of 
government—a dismal economy, an unhappy public, [and] bitter 
partisan-based backlash [resulted in] epic discontent with Congress 
and elected officials.”82  SAR does a fairly good job of explaining the 
economic downturn, the subsequent reactions of American citizens, 
and the ensuing economic and political events.  The explanatory 
power of this theory makes it valuable. 
D.  Availability Cascade Theory 
What explains widespread fixations on unthreatening waste dumps, 
nearly harmless chemicals, and unlikely causes of a tragic airplane 
crash, when for years on end far more serious health hazards, such as 
breast cancer, indoor air pollution, “junk food” consumption, and 
asthma in the inner city have commanded comparatively little 
attention?83 
This is the question Timur Kuran and Cass Sunstein posed more 
than a decade after Kasperson and colleagues published their initial 
paper on social amplification of risk.  The answer, according to Kuran 
and Sunstein, is availability cascades.84  Kuran and Sunstein based 
their notion of availability cascades on the work of Kahneman and 
Tversky, who described the availability heuristic twenty-five years 
 
81 News Release, Pew Research Ctr. for the People and the Press, The People and Their 
Government: Distrust, Discontent, Anger and Partisan Rancor (Apr. 18, 2010), available 
at http://people-press.org/reports/pdf/606.pdf. 
82 Id. 
83 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 703. 
84 Although the first published paper containing an extensive discussion of availability 
cascades was Timur Kuran and Cass R. Sunstein’s Availability Cascades and Risk 
Regulation, supra note 23, several other law review articles referred to the concept in 
1998, citing to the Kuran and Sunstein paper as a work in progress, see, e.g., Christine 
Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471 (1998); 
Cass R. Sunstein, How Law Constructs Preferences, 86 GEO. L.J. 2637 (1998); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Behavioral Analysis of Law, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1997). 
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earlier.85  Kahneman and Tversky described the availability heuristic 
as operating in “situations in which people assess the frequency of a 
class or the probability of an event by the ease with which instances 
or occurrences can be brought to mind. . . .  This judgmental heuristic 
is called availability.”86  The availability heuristic has gained traction 
in legal scholarship, which has defined it as a widely used mental 
shortcut that leads people to assign a higher likelihood to events that 
are readily “available,” which is to say those that are particularly 
likely to come to mind due to their vividness, recency, or frequency.87 
The primary claim of Kuran and Sunstein is that in certain 
instances, the availability heuristic is perpetuated and enlarged by 
certain social mechanisms that serve to reinforce widespread, 
erroneous risk judgments.88  Availability cascades occur when 
information about potential harms travels through social 
communication channels, creating and reinforcing a prevailing 
wisdom.89  The process occurs when “expressed perceptions trigger 
chains of individual responses that make these perceptions appear 
 
85 See Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics 
and Biases, 185 SCIENCE 1124, 1127 (1974) [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, 
Judgment] (introducing “availability” along with other heuristics and biases); see also 
Amos Tversky & Daniel Kahneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases, 
in JUDGMENT, supra note 74, at 11 [hereinafter Tversky & Kahneman, Uncertainty].  For 
some early law review pieces discussing heuristic processing and responses in legal 
frameworks, see Alan Schwartz & Louis L. Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for 
Contract Terms: The Examples of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 VA. L. REV. 1387, 
1436–42 (1983) (discussing the availability and representative heuristics); Barbara D. 
Underwood, Law and the Crystal Ball: Predicting Behavior with Statistical Inference and 
Individualized Judgment, 88 YALE L.J. 1408, 1428 (1979) (“The studies show that in 
making individualized judgments people rely primarily on information about the case at 
hand, paying relatively little attention to background information about other cases.”). 
86 See Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 85, at 1127. 
87 The characteristics (frequency, recency, and vividness) that increase cognitive 
availability (or make specific examples more memorable) have important implications for 
determining when risk communication is likely.  The availability heuristic therefore 
becomes central in formulating a predictive model of risk communication and perception.  
See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685–91; see also Christine Jolls, On Law 
Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF 
IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 268, 270–71 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith eds., 2005); 
Jolls et al., supra note 84, at 1519; Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and 
Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 
CALIF. L. REV. 1051, 1091 (2000); Justin Pidot, Note, The Applicability of Nuisance Law 
to Invasive Plants: Can Common Law Liability Inspire Government Action?, 24 VA. 
ENVTL. L.J. 183, 222–23 (2005); Cass R. Sunstein, Precautions Against What? The 
Availability Heuristic and Cross-Cultural Risk Perception, 57 ALA. L. REV. 75, 77 (2005). 
88 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685. 
89 See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 77. 
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increasingly plausible through their rising availability in public 
discourse.”90  The motivations behind these cascades may be 
reputational or informational.91 
A reputational cascade occurs when individuals espouse views 
because doing so carries with it some sort of social advantage.92  In 
the case of a reputational cascade, the prevailing wisdom is accepted 
and perpetuated independent of, and sometimes in spite of, a society 
member’s actual worldview.93  An informational cascade, in contrast, 
is based upon the genuine acceptance that beliefs that are espoused by 
a significant segment of society must be correct. 94  The informational 
cascade is, therefore, driven by individuals’ searches for data about 
their worlds.95 
In their search for truth and their efforts to maintain a positive 
reputation, individuals perpetuate beliefs that come to them through 
various communication channels by adopting those beliefs and 
 
90 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685; see also Molly J. Walker Wilson & Megan 
P. Fuchs, Publicity, Pressure, and Environmental Legislation: The Untold Story of 
Availability Campaigns, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2147, 2157 (2009) (discussing the “trigger 
phase” in their model of the availability campaign). 
91 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 686.  The concept of informational and 
reputational motivations is related to the similar concepts of injunctive norms (norms of 
which most others approve or disapprove) and descriptive norms (that which most others 
do).  Kuran and Sunstein point out that there may be overlap between these two types of 
cascades and that this overlap occurs when individuals affected by these cascades have 
dual underlying motivations: obtaining information and gaining social approval.  Id. at 
687.  See generally Robert B. Cialdini et al., A Focus Theory of Normative Conduct: 
Recycling the Concept of Norms to Reduce Littering in Public Places, 58 J. PERSONALITY 
& SOC. PSYCHOL. 1015, 1023 (1990). 
92 See Timur Kuran, Ethnic Norms and Their Transformation Through Reputational 
Cascades, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 623, 623 (1998) (“[A] reputational cascade [is] a self-
reinforcing process by which people motivated to protect and enhance their reputations 
induce each other to step up their ethnic activities.”). 
93 Id. 
94 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 686; Sushil Bikhchandani et al., A Theory of 
Fads, Fashion, Custom, and Cultural Change as Informational Cascades, 100 J. POL. 
ECON. 992 (1992) (discussing the utilitarian nature of informational cascades); see also 
Sushil Bikhchandani et al., Learning from the Behavior of Others: Conformity, Fads, and 
Informational Cascades, 12 J. ECON. PERSP. 151 (1998) [hereinafter Bikhchandani et al., 
Learning]. 
95 For a discussion of how informational cascades can exacerbate risk aversion in a 
medical setting, see James Gibson, Doctrinal Feedback and (Un)reasonable Care, 94 VA. 
L. REV. 1641, 1670 (2008) (“[M]edicine is subject to informational cascades: the more 
physicians that adopt a new procedure, the greater the chance that other physicians will 
discount any individual misgivings and follow the herd.”).  See generally Bikhchandani et 
al., Learning, supra note 94 (discussing herd behavior generally). 
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communicating them to other members of society.96  Reputational 
and truth-seeking goals tend to reinforce and expand availability 
cascades.  This process might not be problematic, according to Kuran 
and Sunstein, if it were not for the fact that the information about risk 
that travels like “wildfire”97 through social discourse is often 
incorrect or misleading.98  Socially communicated risk information 
contains inflated estimates of risk and causes “public panics.”99  
Kuran and Sunstein are careful to qualify their claim; they stop short 
of characterizing as maladaptive human tendencies to seek 
information through social channels.  They acknowledge that social 
networks are valuable sources for information about potential 
harms.100  According to Kuran and Sunstein, the inefficiency occurs, 
not because people look to others for information to form the basis for 
beliefs, but because communication cascades can help to create and 
reinforce availability effects, which in turn, can lead to widespread 
misperceptions.101 
Although the primary article was coauthored by Kuran and 
Sunstein, Sunstein has written a series of articles and essays—several 
of which serve as the foundation for Sunstein’s book Laws of Fear—
that elaborate on the initial availability campaign paper.  Sunstein’s 
goal in this body of work is primarily normative.  He argues that an 
effective government should be deliberative rather than simply 
 
96 See Sunstein, supra note 87, at 96; see also Recent Cases, Wang v. Attorney General, 
423 F.3d 260 (3d. Cir. 2005), and Benslimane v. Gonzales, 430 F.3d 828 (7th Cir. 2005), 
119 HARV. L. REV. 2596, 2601 (2006) (explaining that “politicians and the media repeat 
salient the examples in a self-reinforcing ‘availability cascade’”). 
97 This notion that information about fear travels like wildfire through society is the 
subject of a chapter in Sunstein’s book, Laws of Fear entitled “Fear as Wildfire.”  See 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR 89–108 (2005). 
98 See id. 
99 See id. 
100 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 689 (“There is nothing irrational about 
participating in an informational cascade.  Often people have little information about the 
magnitude of a risk or the seriousness of an alleged social problem.  They stand to gain 
from tuning into, and letting themselves be guided by, the signals of others.”). 
101 See Tversky & Kahneman, Uncertainty, supra note 85, at 11–14 (describing how the 
availability heuristic can lead to errors in reasoning and decision making); see also Kuran 
& Sunstein, supra note 23, at 688 (acknowledging that availability campaigns can spark 
useful debate on neglected issues, but maintaining that “availability campaigns sometimes 
do great harm by producing widespread availability errors”); id. at 685 (“Under certain 
circumstances . . . [availability cascades] generate persistent social availability errors–
widespread mistaken beliefs grounded in interactions between the availability heuristic 
and the social mechanisms we describe.  The resulting mass delusions may last 
indefinitely, and they may produce wasteful or even detrimental laws and policies.” 
(internal footnote omitted)). 
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reactive.  He makes the case that public panics can influence policy, 
resulting in inefficient and potentially harmful legislation.102  
Sunstein also takes issue with the precautionary principle, namely the 
notion that when a potential risk is identified, steps should be taken to 
guard against the risk, even when scientific consensus is lacking.  A 
primary claim of Sunstein’s body of work on risk response is that the 
tendency to take precautions against publicly perceived threats often 
imposes more costs than taking no action at all.  According to 
Sunstein, availability cascades result in widespread—often 
misplaced—alarm, and can result in action that leads to a net loss to 
society. 
E.  The Cultural Evaluator Model and the Role of Emotion 
The rationale for omitting the public from risk policy decisions—as 
seen in the work of Kuran and Sunstein as well as in traditional risk 
management—is the notion that members of the public are 
irrationally influenced by their emotional reactions.103  The cultural 
view of risk perception questions this assumption.  Recent scholars 
interested in cultural antecedents of risk response question the notion 
that “facts” ascertained by experts should serve as the exclusive basis 
for sound risk policy.104  Instead, scholars argue that “facts cannot be 
 
102 Cass R. Sunstein, Cognition and Cost-Benefit Analysis, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1059, 
1067 (2000) (noting that cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic can produce a 
public demand for regulation even though the relevant risks are trivial, while producing 
little or no demand for regulation of risks that are large in magnitude); see also Sunstein, 
supra note 87, at 98 (noting that cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic can 
produce a public demand for regulation regardless of the actual risk). 
103 Paul Slovic, The Risk Game, 86 J. HAZARDOUS MATERIALS 17, 18 (2001) (“[Public 
risk judgments] are seen as irrational by many harsh critics of public perceptions.  These 
critics draw a sharp dichotomy between the experts and the public.  Experts are seen as 
purveying risk assessments, characterized as objective, analytic, wise, and rational––based 
on the real risks.  In contrast, the public is seen to rely upon perceptions of risk that are 
subjective, often hypothetical, emotional, foolish, and irrational.”); see also Kuran & 
Sunstein, supra note 23, at 683 (supporting the notion that emotions can cause irrational 
decision making in the dual system concept of reasoning).  System 1 reasoning is “fast, 
automatic, effortless, associative, and often emotionally charged.”  Daniel Kahneman, 
Maps of Bounded Rationality: Psychology for Behavioral Economics, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 
1449, 1451 (2003).  On the other hand, System 2 reasoning is slow and deliberate, and 
more likely to include consideration of probabilities and careful weighing of costs and 
benefits.  Id.  The implication of this view is that System 1 is necessary in situations that 
lack information and resources and is more likely to result in error than System 2.  See 
Kahan, supra note 26; Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 181; see also BECK, supra note 9, 
at 24; Fischhoff et al., supra note 28. 
104  See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18 (“Assessment procedures derived from 
the public health, toxicity, and engineering studies that have dominated the management 
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separated from values in policy-related science contexts.”105  Put 
differently, risk judgments are socially constructed and do not exist as 
independent “truths” to be discovered.106  For the proponent of a 
cultural model, affective (emotional) responses to risk are expressions 
of socially and culturally derived values.107  As such, these affective 
responses gain legitimacy in the risk policy discussion.  Legal scholar 
Dan Kahan writes, “When people draw on their emotions to judge the 
risk that such an activity poses, they form an expressively rational 
attitude about what it would mean for their cultural worldviews for 
society to credit the claim that that activity is dangerous and worthy 
of regulation . . . .”108 
Cultural theory is sometimes discussed with reference to cultural 
“biases,” or patterns of social relationships and cultural 
understandings that result in particular worldviews.109  A central 
feature of the theory is the notion that culturally derived values have 
legitimate influences over risk preferences.110  The membership of an 
individual in a certain class—hierarchical, egalitarian, individualistic, 
and fatalistic—may help gauge that individual’s risk tolerance and 
preferences.111  Importantly, because all human beings are cultural 
evaluators, no one individual can act as an unbiased “expert” free 
from cultural influences on risk evaluations.  Hence, to allow certain 
individuals to serve as “experts” with unique power to formulate risk 
responses is to privilege the cultural understandings of a few members 
of society at the expense of the cultural understandings of the rest of 
 
programs of governments and corporations illuminate one portion of the risk complex 
while concealing others.”); see also Slovic, supra note 8, at 285 (arguing for the 
importance of the public’s role in risk assessment). 
105 Judith A. Bradbury, The Policy Implications of Differing Concepts of Risk, 14 SCI., 
TECH. & HUM. VALUES 380, 381 (1989). 
106 See id. at 381. 
107 See generally Kahan, supra note 26. 
108 Id. at 750–51. 
109 The term “bias” is a bit of a misnomer, given that bias tends to have consistently 
negative connotations.  “Cultural tendencies” is probably more reflective of the nature of 
these underlying predilections. 
110 Marris et al., supra note 5, at 636. 
111 Thompson and colleagues have discussed the variables as follows: “Group refers to 
the extent to which an individual is incorporated into bounded units.  The greater the 
incorporation, the more individual choice is subject to group determination.  Grid denotes 
the degree to which an individual’s life is circumscribed by externally imposed 
prescriptions.”  MICHAEL THOMPSON ET AL., CULTURAL THEORY 5 (1990). 
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society.112  Anthropologist Mary Douglas has argued that purportedly 
value-neutral scientists and policy analysts commonly foist their own 
values on the public.  Douglas claimed that the risk researcher’s 
“method assumes that all humans have the same responses and 
preferences that are enshrined in the utilitarian philosophy. Instead of 
objectivity, we find ideological entrenchment.”113  The often 
wholesale substitution of experts’ opinions for those of the public is 
particularly problematic when considering data from studies 
suggesting that the public and experts hold divergent views about 
risks.114  Another critical aspect of the cultural evaluator model is the 
belief that individuals may have deeply personal reasons for choosing 
certain risks over others.115  Accordingly, a uniform approach to any 
particular source of risk should therefore be undertaken with the 
understanding that it may subvert the values of some members of 
society. 
The availability cascade and cultural evaluator theories offer 
opposing normative claims in the area of risk policy and response.  
Sunstein and Kahan have particular prescriptive agendas for risk 
managers and lawmakers.  Rather than debating the merits of each 
claim in order to declare a victor, the method this Article proposes 
extracts the elements underlying the predictive arguments.  After 
distilling the data that serves as the basis for the normative arguments, 
this Article incorporates the relevant information into the model. 
F.  Why a Comprehensive Model Is Necessary 
1.  Limitations of Existing Theories 
While each of the above methods of risk analysis lends something 
important to the discussion, none of the theories I have discussed 
provides a comprehensive framework to guide risk policy decisions.  
Moreover, the theories are distinct: they do not build on one another, 
 
112 See id.; see also SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 126 (providing examples of works that 
propose substituting public risk decisions with those of unbiased experts).  See generally 
Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23. 
113 MARY DOUGLAS, RISK AND BLAME: ESSAYS IN CULTURAL THEORY 13 (1992) 
(“When he brackets off culture from his work, the well-intentioned risk analyst has tied his 
own hands.  He wants to be free of bias, he would rather pretend that bias is not important 
than sully himself by trying to categorize kinds of bias.”); accord MARY DOUGLAS & 
AARON WILDAVSKY, supra note 2 (1982). 
114 See James Flynn & Paul Slovic, Expert and Public Evaluations of Technological 
Risks: Searching for Common Ground, 10 RISK 333, 356–57 (1999). 
115 Kahan, supra note 26, at 741. 
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nor do they consistently learn from one another.116  Hence, each is 
necessarily incomplete.  In addition, each of the theories and methods 
has specific drawbacks.  This Article synthesizes the various 
theoretical perspectives to arrive at a complete model of public risk 
perception.  The model represents a vital step toward a new 
understanding of how individuals assess and respond to potential 
threats.  The model is designed to provide insight to risk managers 
and policy makers in the course of decision making.  The model 
should also serve as a basis for further conversation and healthy 
debate about the role of the citizenry and experts in risk management. 
Psychometric studies of risk perception are useful to the extent that 
they produce a detailed picture of those risks people report to be most 
worrisome.  However, this method suffers from the fact that it asks 
questions about risk in a socially static context.117  Surveys about risk 
capture a snapshot of the risk judgments of a number of people 
without providing a good understanding of the degree to which those 
judgments are individual or a source of social understandings.  At any 
given time, the risk perception of an individual might be influenced 
by information and evaluations of one or more other individuals.  
Psychometric studies of risk perception do not capture any of the 
social dynamic involved in risk perception.118  Moreover, asking 
respondents in a laboratory setting about their attitudes regarding 
various types of hazards sacrifices external validity; in other words, 
responses elicited in this fashion may not be genuine.119  An 
experimental setting is not necessarily representative of what occurs 
by the water cooler, on the neighborhood sidewalk, or at dinner 
parties.  In those settings, there is a complex meeting of social, 
cultural, communication, and human elements. 
Social amplification of risk attempts to correct the primary failing 
of psychometric studies by incorporating an understanding of the 
social dynamic involved in risk response.  However, while SAR is an 
impressive attempt to derive a comprehensive model, the model 
accounts for only some of the empirically supported antecedents of 
 
116 The exception is SAR, which takes into account psychometric risk analysis. 
117 See Sjöberg, supra note 5, at 667. 
118 There are other criticisms of this method as well.  One is that the data derived is 
based upon self-reporting, which is a problematic method of gathering data because people 
are not always accurate or forthright about their own attitudes or behaviors. 
119 See generally Bradbury, supra note 105, at 383–84 (suggesting that psychometric 
studies provide a subjectivist interpretation within an artificial paradigm that may provide 
unreliable results). 
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risk perception.120  Moreover, although it is true that, as the SAR 
authors claim, “risk analysis . . . requires an approach that is capable 
of illuminating risk in its full complexity, is sensitive to the social 
settings in which risk occurs, and also recognizes that social 
interactions may either amplify or attenuate the signals to society 
about the risk,”121 the model is exceedingly complex.  The SAR 
model is arguably too elaborate to be useable and testable. 
Kuran and Sunstein’s work on the availability cascade is based 
upon the availability heuristic, a feature of human cognition that 
science has documented extensively.  Although the theory is 
compelling, its foundation is a normative claim, and its “proof” is 
historical anecdote.  Because it is backward-looking, the theory lacks 
predictive power.  Moreover, Kuran and Sunstein’s normative claim 
is subject to criticism on several fronts.122  First, the claim assumes 
that risks possessing certain features are worthy of attention and 
resource expenditure, while others are not.123  Second, the claim also 
recommends handing over the decision making to “experts,” an 
approach that scholars increasingly question.124  As Beck has noted, 
“There is no expert on risk . . . .  Where and how does one draw the 
line between still acceptable and no longer acceptable exposures?”125  
Third, unchecked deference to risk experts also undervalues the 
potential benefits stemming from social pressure for change.126  
Fourth, the claim assumes a unidirectional effect of social cascades.  
As Arie Rip points out, “[T]he focus as well as the concern is about 
intensification and the additional social costs accompanying 
‘exaggerated’ responses . . . while there is no [equivalent discussion 
 
120 Pidgeon, supra note 60, at 148–49. 
121 Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96; see also Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 
90. 
122 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685 (“Under certain circumstances . . . 
[availability cascades] generate persistent social availability errors—widespread mistaken 
beliefs grounded in interactions between the availability heuristic and the social 
mechanisms we describe.  The resulting mass delusions may last indefinitely, and they 
may produce wasteful or even detrimental laws and policies.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
123 The claim alleges to possess a wisdom that trumps the prevailing wisdom of the 
time.  See Molly J. Walker Wilson, Adaptive Responses to Risk and the Irrationally 
Emotional Public, 54 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1297 (2010).  See generally DOUGLAS, supra note 
113. 
124 See Sjöberg, supra note 5, at 666 (explaining that experts give considerably lower 
risk estimates than the public whenever they rate risks that fall within their own field of 
expertise and responsibility). 
125 BECK, supra note 9, at 29 (emphasis omitted). 
126 See Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 90. 
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or] example of the social costs of attenuation of risk.”127  Fifth, the 
theory is of limited practical use in predicting public responses to 
potential sources of danger because the theory lacks a comprehensive 
mechanism for predicting specific factors and environments that 
contribute to public risk perception.128 
2.  What We Stand to Gain from a Comprehensive Model 
In addition to the limitations explained above, because each of the 
theoretical perspectives addresses a different focus, none of them 
provides a complete picture of how members of the public view 
different types of risks in the diverse social and cultural circumstances 
that can influence and shape perceptions.  A model that draws on the 
best of each body of work gains a richness that any one approach 
standing alone lacks.  This model also—because it is self-consciously 
focused on public perception—supplies lawmakers and experts what 
they have been lacking: the ability to include the individual, lay 
perspective in the decision-making equation. 
Inclusion of the public in the decision-making process will result in 
a more discursive, thoughtful process of decision making in the face 
of some of the most serious threats.129  Because their understanding 
of public risk perception is so limited, law and policy makers 
currently lack the ability to incorporate public attitudes prior to taking 
a course of action.  Instead, they must wait for the public’s reaction 
after the fact, and then the feedback is often limited to situations in 
which the outcome is sufficiently disastrous to generate public 
outrage.  The advantages of lawmakers’ having a model that could 
help determine risk preferences of members of the public in advance 
cannot be overstated.130 
 
127 Rip, supra note 58, at 193.  Rip questions the assumption that social amplification is 
necessarily problematic, as his title illustrates: Should Social Amplification of Risk Be 
Counteracted? 
128 In advancing his claims, Sunstein draws on the theories of Fischhoff, Slovic, Beck, 
and Kasperson, all of which are also discussed in this Article. 
129 See David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1328 (2003) (arguing that decision makers are more likely to 
carefully consider the consequences of various risks when the public is involved in the 
conversation). 
130 Dan M. Kahan et al., Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on 
Risk, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1071, 1071 (2006) (“The public welfare of democratic societies 
depends on their capacity to abate all manner of natural and man-made hazards . . . .”); see 
also Fischhoff et al., supra note 28 (“Citizens of modern industrial societies are presently 
learning a harsh and discomforting lesson––that the benefits from technology must be paid 
for not only with money, but with lives. . . .  With increasing frequency, policy makers . . . 
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III 
FOCI OF EXISTING RISK PARADIGMS 
Scholars who have studied risk perception have generally focused 
on one of several methodologies.  One line of research has applied 
broad findings from behavioral decision making to risk 
perceptions.131  Researchers have also attempted to derive a 
“cognitive map” of risk perception by identifying which 
characteristics of hazards are particularly likely to trigger fear or 
concern.132  Another focus of research emphasizes the social 
component of risk perception, examining the dynamic nature of risk 
communication as information travels through public discourse.133  
Yet another line of work focuses on the impact of cultural or sub-
cultural factors on beliefs about risks.134  Each theoretical approach 
has provided a different emphasis; each has yielded valuable insights, 
and yet, none is sufficient on its own.  This Article discusses areas or 
issues emphasized by the different perspectives below.  The following 
discussion sets the stage for subsequent consideration of the factors 
most likely to cause individuals concern. 
A.  Features of Human Decision Making and Cognition 
Any discussion of decision making under conditions of uncertainty 
would be incomplete without the consideration of elements of human 
cognition first described by Herbert Simon, a psychologist, 
sociologist, and political scientist, who was interested in the question 
of how human beings make decisions.  In 1955, Simon published a 
paper introducing the notion of “bounded rationality.”135  The notion 
 
have been turning to risk-benefit analysis . . . as the basic decision-making methodology 
for societal risk-taking.”); Paul Slovic et al., Why Study Risk Perception?, 2 RISK 
ANALYSIS 83, 83 (1982) (arguing that the question “‘How safe is safe enough?’ appears 
likely to be [a] major policy issue[]”). 
131 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28. 
132 See Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, in SLOVIC, supra note 4, at 224–26. 
133 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 177. 
134 These four topic areas represent the major themes in risk perception.  Other themes 
surface in the context of risk management, such as the appropriate role of democratic 
participation and governance, and philosophical considerations about the value of a small 
number of lives versus conveniences benefiting society in general. 
135 Herbert Simon introduced the notion of “bounded rationality” in the 1950s to 
account for the fact that human beings have finite computational resources available for 
making choices.  See generally 2 HERBERT A. SIMON, MODELS OF BOUNDED 
RATIONALITY (1982); Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. 
ECON. 99 (1955) [hereinafter Simon, Behavioral].   
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that people are boundedly rational (or “satisficers”), refers to human 
beings’ limited capacity to collect, store, and retrieve information, as 
well as the tendency of individuals to fail to apply standard rules of 
logic when making decisions.  Simon and other proponents of 
bounded rationality questioned rational choice theory (RCT), the 
neoclassical economic theory predicting that human beings 
effectively maximize their own expected utility through decision-
making contexts.136  RCT has not held up under close empirical 
scrutiny.137  Social science research has revealed an extensive 
network of interrelated heuristics and biases that serve as the basis for 
much of human decision making.138  In the simplest terms, empirical 
investigations have borne out Simon’s hypothesis, demonstrating that 
human beings have limited memories, an inability to gather all 
relevant information and correctly weigh factors, and the tendency to 
be influenced by biased or irrelevant information.139 
Behavioral decision theorists, who focus on identifying cognitive 
patterns and social factors that influence decision making, have been 
profoundly influenced by the work of Simon.140  Eschewing rational 
 
136 See generally Thomas S. Ulen, Rational Choice Theory in Law and Economics, in 
THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 710 (Boudewijn Bouckaert & Gerrit De 
Geest eds., 1996). 
137 See Simon, Behavioral, supra note 135 (exemplifying an early discussion of 
behavioral decision making); see also BEHAVIORAL LAW AND ECONOMICS (Cass R. 
Sunstein ed., 2000); CHOICES, VALUES, AND FRAMES (Daniel Kahneman & Amos 
Tversky eds., 2000) (discussing empirical investigations of how human beings process 
information and make choices). 
138 Scholars discuss these heuristics and biases under the rubric of “behavioral decision 
theory” or “behavioral law and economics” and include anchoring and adjustment, 
optimism bias, representativeness heuristic, hindsight bias, conjunction fallacy, 
endowment effect and related status quo bias, risk aversion, and the availability heuristic, 
to name a few. 
139 Decision making using incomplete or imperfect information is an important feature 
of human functioning in the real world.  Scholarship supporting this notion is abundant.  
The interdisciplinary field that explores cognitive features of human decision making 
combines law, psychology, and economic principles—as they relate to the “rational actor.”  
See, e.g., Jolls et al., supra note 84, at 1476 (“The task of behavioral law and economics, 
simply stated, is to explore the implications of actual (not hypothesized) human behavior 
for the law.  How do ‘real people’ differ from homo economicus?”). 
140 See Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Choices, Values, and Frames, 39 AM. 
PSYCHOLOGIST 341, 347–48 (1984); Daniel Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Prospect 
Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk, 47 ECONOMETRICA 263 (1979); Daniel 
Kahneman & Amos Tversky, Subjective Probability: A Judgment of Representativeness, 3 
COGNITIVE PSYCHOL. 430, 430 (1972).  Some early law review pieces discuss heuristic 
processing and responses in legal frameworks.  See Schwartz & Wilde, supra note 85, at 
1436–42 (discussing the availability and representative heuristics); see also Underwood, 
supra note 85 (“[S]tudies show that in making individualized judgments people rely 
WILSON 10/28/2011  10:35 AM 
2011] Cultural Understandings of Risk and the Tyranny of the Experts 145 
choice theory in favor of Simon’s bounded rationality, modern 
behavioral decision theorists have attempted to explain how human 
beings make decisions in light of empirically demonstrated realities of 
choice formation.  Nowhere is this body of work more relevant than 
in the context of the type of decision making involved in evaluating 
risks.  Like other decision tasks, seeking information, analyzing the 
information, and determining the appropriate approach involves 
searching, storage, and retrieval of information, perception, and 
reasoning.141  Hence, research and theory on decision making 
generally has clear relevance for risk perception and response.  In 
fact, risk responses may be particularly vulnerable to nonrational 
judgment formation because this type of decision making often 
involves a high degree of uncertainty.  Moreover, information about 
risks is particularly well suited to exploitation by motivated actors.142  
The literature on heuristics and biases in decision making can provide 
a good foundation for understanding particular patterns of decision 
making in the area of risk.  Limits on the rationality of human 
decision making have been discussed at length elsewhere, and 
behavioral scientists have found a systematic lack of rationality in 
how individual members of the public respond to potential 
dangers.143 
B.  Characteristics of the Communication Context 
Over the past century, the number of sources of information about 
risk has grown tremendously.  Whereas risk information used to be 
conveyed by public officials, carried in newspaper stories, and, most 
commonly, traded during face-to-face communication between 
members of society, today, the risk communication picture is 
increasingly multifaceted and complex.144  Some commentators opine 
 
primarily on information about the case at hand, paying relatively little attention to 
background information about other cases.”). 
141 See Peter M. Todd & Gerd Gigerenzer, What We Have Learned (So Far), in SIMPLE 
HEURISTICS THAT MAKE US SMART 357 (Gerd Gigerenzer et al. eds., 1999) (explaining 
how the use of heuristics involves information search, stop search, and decision). 
142 See Jon D. Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some 
Evidence of Market Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420, 1456 (1999) (listing the ways 
in which advertisers can exploit features of human decision making—particularly with 
respect to product-related risks—for financial gain). 
143 See generally BARRY GLASSNER, THE CULTURE OF FEAR: WHY AMERICANS ARE 
AFRAID OF THE WRONG THINGS (2000); SLOVIC, supra note 4; COHL, supra note 14. 
144 See William Leiss, Three Phases in the Evolution of Risk Communication Practice, 
545 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 85 (1996) (tracking the evolution of risk 
communication during the last twenty years).  See generally Baruch Fischhoff, Risk 
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that the growth in the number of communication forms have 
contributed to the advent of the “risk culture” of today.  According to 
David Altheide, 
Fear is more visible and routine in public discourse than it was a 
decade ago. . . .  This communication environment is part of our 
everyday world; it is popular culture and we are it, and we like it; 
we play with it; we play with the reporters and the institutional 
news sources who exploit the fear script for their own benefits.145 
Differences in how members of the public receive information 
about risks mean that there are myriad possible sources of “input.”  It 
also means that there is potential for these sources to interact and 
amplify or attenuate perceptions about risks.  For example, if Susan 
hears her neighbor express concern about negative health effects from 
hormones in beef, she can seek out more information on the Internet.  
On the Internet, she will no doubt discover a range of information 
sources, from online news stories, to individuals expressing views via 
blogs or in chat rooms, to official reports issued by the National 
Institutes of Health.  Depending upon which sites she reads, she will 
be comforted or increasingly concerned.  The story is made more 
complicated still by the fact that various patterns of communication 
led to the views expressed on the websites available to Susan.  Thus, 
the picture of communication about risk is an increasingly complex 
one consisting of expert opinion, media selection and promulgation, 
and social discourse. 
Risk communication research is a body of work that has grown out 
of the collective attempt of investigators, agency heads, and political 
leaders to carry on a productive dialogue with the public about 
various risks.146  Researchers have composed many of the writings 
 
Perception and Communication Unplugged: Twenty Years of Process, 15 RISK ANALYSIS 
137 (1995).  Fischhoff identifies a series of seven different developmental stages in risk 
communication: 
(1) All we have to do is get the numbers right, 
(2) All we have to do is tell them the numbers, 
(3) All we have to do is explain what we mean by the numbers, 
(4) All we have to do is show them that they’ve accepted similar risks in the past, 
(5) All we have to do is show them that it’s a good deal for them, 
(6) All we have to do is treat them nice, 
(7) All we have to do is make them partners. 
Id. at 138 tbl.1. 
145 Altheide, supra note 13, at 664. 
146 See, e.g., Lee M. Thomas, Foreword to EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION: THE 
ROLE AND RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVERNMENT AND NONGOVERNMENT ORGANIZATIONS 
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available on risk communication with the purpose of providing 
investigators, political leaders, and agency administrators with 
strategic guidance regarding effective risk communication.  Another 
broad area of research has focused on the impact of the media on how 
members of society view risks.147  Finally, research on the influence 
of heuristics and biases has revealed the importance of features of the 
communication context for resulting risk perception.148  Findings 
from each of these bodies of scholarship can inform a comprehensive 
theory of how risk communication and idea exchange ultimately 
influences risk perception. 
C.  The Role of Facilitators 
H.L. Mencken once said that “the whole aim of practical politics is 
to keep the populace alarmed (and hence clamorous to be led to 
safety) by an endless series of hobgoblins, most of them 
imaginary.”149  Closely related to both the bounded rationality 
literature and to the work on risk communication is consideration of 
strategic attempts to influence mass behavior.  Timur Kuran and Cass 
Sunstein dub players who engage in public opinion crafting, 
“availability entrepreneurs.”150  The term “availability entrepreneur” 
connotes a particular ideological slant or “pet cause.”  This Article 
uses the term “facilitator” in place of “entrepreneur” because the 
media, which plays a significant role in shaping public beliefs, tends 
to be driven by different considerations than traditional entrepreneurs 
such as watchdog groups, grassroots organizations, and industry 
leaders.  The term “facilitator” includes the availability entrepreneur 
(as conceived of by Kuran and Sunstein) as well as anyone who 
stands to benefit from promulgating information for purposes 
garnering public attention.  The media is a prime example.151 
 
(Vincent T. Covello et al. eds., 1987) (“One of the greatest challenges facing those 
concerned with health and environmental risks is how to carry on a useful public dialogue 
on these subjects.  In a democracy, it is the public that ultimately makes the key decisions 
on how these risks will be controlled.  The stakes are too high for us not to do our very 
best.”). 
147 Altheide, supra note 13, at 664; see also Anders af Wåhlberg & Lennart Sjöberg, 
Risk Perception and the Media, 3 J. RISK RES. 31 (2000). 
148 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178; see also Slovic, supra note 8; Charles Vlek & 
Pieter-Jan Stallen, Judging Risks and Benefits in the Small and in the Large, 28 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUMAN PERFORMANCE 235 (1981). 
149 HENRY LOUIS MENCKEN, IN DEFENSE OF WOMEN 53 (1922). 
150 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 701. 
151 This Article discusses the media at length infra Part IV. 
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During a political campaign season or any time an individual or 
group is particularly interested in advancing an agenda on the national 
stage, there is an increased likelihood of risks of being publicized.152  
Facilitators commonly frame issues in a manner that makes the 
danger appear particularly imminent and destructive.153  Often there 
will be a battle between facilitators with opposing agendas, and 
facilitators will play up the dangers inherent in one risk, in defense of 
other potential hazards.154  Facilitators’ motivations are influenced by 
temporal factors and cultural factors among others.  The success of 
such facilitators in exciting the populace depends upon conditions 
such as the state of current technology, the degree to which the 
population has been primed to fear certain activities, and other factors 
that make members of society receptive to risk communications. 
D.  Characteristics of the Risk 
We can think about the risks we face on two different levels: the 
micro (individual hazard) level and the macro (general fear of 
hazards) level.155  One category of risk perception involves risks that 
individual citizens routinely encounter.  Members of the public view 
some classes of hazards as particularly threatening and other classes 
of hazards as relatively innocuous.156  Psychometric risk researchers 
seek to explain differences in attitudes about various types of 
potential hazards, to identify which potential risks cause the most 
concern, and to identify why they do so.157  As previously noted, 
today’s risks are widely characterized as particularly challenging for 
several reasons.  New technologies pose particular hazards because 
their dangers may not be discovered for some period of time.158  
Pressures to implement new technologies and the potential for 
financial gain mean that manufacturers and developers may downplay 
 
152 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 185.  It is tempting to draw the conclusion that 
public concern over a risk that is publicized as part of a political strategy is, by definition, 
overblown.  However, that is not necessarily the case.  See Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 90. 
153 See Paul Slovic et al., Decision Processes, Rationality and Adjustment to Natural 
Hazards, in SLOVIC, supra note 4, at 7. 
154 BECK, supra note 9, at 31. 
155 Wahlberg & Sjöberg, supra note 147, at 37. 
156 Some examples are nuclear waste (high), automobile use (low), terrorism (high), and 
global warming (changing). 
157 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28. 
158 See Slovic, supra note 8. 
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the potential for harm or may curtail research efforts.159  Threats to 
health and well-being from new products and processes may be 
difficult to asses, even with substantial research findings.160  In 
particular, hazards associated with novel inventions can sometimes 
have negative impacts into the future, threatening the health of the 
nation’s children and grandchildren.161 
When it comes to individual risk assessment, there are substantial 
discrepancies in the perceived seriousness of various potential harms.  
As discussed previously, the most common method of studying risk 
perception is to ask individuals to assess various potential hazards in 
order to determine which are perceived to pose the greatest risk.162  
The psychometric study of risk has also included attempts to 
determine which characteristics of a hazard or hazard situation are 
likely to trigger concern.163  A number of empirical investigations of 
risk preference have revealed some reliable patterns of public (as 
opposed to expert) risk perception.  Risks that are assumed 
involuntarily, and those that are associated with unfamiliar sources 
and that have potentially catastrophic consequences (such as risks 
posed by nuclear energy) are particularly likely to cause fear.164  
Conversely, risks associated with familiar activities in which the 
potential for harm is localized and in which the risk is voluntarily 
 
159 See Dorothy Nelkin, Communicating Technological Risk: The Social Construction 
of Risk Perception, 10 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 95, 96 (1989) (reviewing the issues 
involved in communicating risk to the public). 
160 See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. 
The familiar scourges of famine, disease, and pestilence no longer dominate the 
risk experience, which, instead, now involves negotiating a new and perplexing 
array of global threats associated with modern armaments, chemicals and 
radiation often invisible to the senses, contaminants whose effects surface only 
after decades or generations, hazards created by peoples and technologies in 
distant part of the globe, and harms arising from the flow and control of 
information. 
Id. 
161 See BECK, supra note 9, at 22 (“Atomic accidents are accidents no more in the 
limited sense of the word ‘accident.’  They outlast generations.” (internal parenthetical 
omitted)). 
162 See id. 
163 Chauncey Starr wrote what is arguably the earliest research using this method.  See 
Chauncey Starr, Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk, 165 SCIENCE 1232 (1969) 
(positing that society has, by trial and error, determined an acceptable level of safety for 
many common activities, and calling this theory the “revealed preference” approach). 
164 See generally SLOVIC, supra note 4; Fischhoff et al., supra note 28; Kasperson & 
Kasperson, supra note 18; Kasperson et al., supra note 1. 
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assumed, seem less threatening.165  By examining beliefs about latent 
dangers, some critical patterns emerge that may have predictive 
potential in the broader public risk perception context. 
E.  Characteristics of the Targets and Victims 
1.  The Relationship Between Target and Victim 
One of the primary differences between traditional risk analysis, on 
the one hand, and psychometric, cultural, or decision theory-based 
approaches to risk management, on the other, is the source of the data.  
Whereas traditional risk analysis is based upon scientific data and 
expert analysis, more recent approaches have solicited the views of 
nonexperts, so-called “average citizens.”166  Intriguing and potentially 
critical questions arise with respect to whether those evaluating risks 
are “stakeholders.”  If the person evaluating the risk is also a potential 
victim of that risk (a stakeholder), he or she may predictably respond 
differently to the risk than would a non-stakeholder.  An individual 
may also be a stakeholder if he or she has a strong interest in the well-
being of a potential victim (as is true in the case of a parent-child 
relationship). 
Not surprisingly, whether an individual who is evaluating a risk is 
a stakeholder makes a difference in how that individual perceives the 
risk.  A stakeholder experiences more emotion with respect to a risk 
when that risk is self-relevant.167  Emotions, in turn, play an 
important role not only in how much people care about addressing 
harms, but also in how they evaluate future outcomes.  Anger, for 
instance, is correlated with an optimistic view, while sadness is 
correlated with pessimism.168  To the extent that emotions are 
heightened in stakeholders, existing predilections will be 
exaggerated.169  Interestingly, however, respondents avoid 
 
165 See generally SLOVIC, supra note 4; Fischhoff et al., supra note 28; Kasperson et al., 
supra note 1; Slovic, supra note 8. 
166 See Slovic, supra note 37.  
167 See Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotional Paternalism, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 70 
(2007) (suggesting that strong emotional reactions to self-relevant risks might lead 
legislatures to take action to prevent affected members of the public from making hasty, 
ill-advised decisions). 
168 Jennifer S. Lerner et al., Effects of Fear and Anger on Perceived Risks of Terrorism: 
A National Field Experiment, 14 PSYCHOL. SCI. 144, 148 (2003) (“Experiencing more 
anger triggered more optimistic beliefs; experiencing more fear triggered greater 
pessimism.”). 
169 See Kahan, supra note 26, at 757 (“[P]erceptions of danger naturally feed upon one 
another among persons who share cultural commitments.  This form of group polarization 
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characterizing themselves as stakeholders when possible.  When there 
is uncertainty as to the scope and direction of a risk, respondents are 
significantly more likely to see others as at risk than the respondents 
are to see themselves as potential victims.170 
The risk perception picture is more complicated than the 
stakeholder–non-stakeholder dichotomy would suggest, because even 
citizens who are not directly affected by a particular threat may care 
deeply about how government or private industry responds to the 
harm.  Specifically, risks to subgroups within the United States are 
likely to have special significance for the American population more 
generally because how our government protects its citizens is a matter 
of concern to the society as a whole.171  The oft-cited Love Canal 
disaster is a situation in which the public at large received (and sought 
out) information about dangers facing residents of Love Canal.  
Ultimately, the question for Americans watching the Love Canal 
events unfold was, how does the U.S. government respond when a 
toxic waste site is discovered under a settled community?172  A more 
recent example is Hurricane Katrina.  The government’s response to 
Hurricane Katrina was no doubt unsettling to Americans, not only 
because they felt outrage over injustices or empathy for the victims, 
but also because the American public witnessed the failure of its 
 
in risk perceptions, then, is another dynamic that can be explained consistently with the 
view that emotion is a form of expressive perception and not a cognitive bias.” (internal 
citation omitted)). 
170 Lerner et al., supra note 168, at 149 tbl.3.  Lerner also found that the effects of 
emotion on risk perception generalizes from the perceived likelihood of self-relevant 
outcomes (“will it happen to me?”) to other-relevant outcomes.  Id. at 148.  This tendency 
is related to the optimism bias, the tendency to attribute superior traits to one’s self and to 
predict positive outcomes for one’s own future.  See K. Patricia Cross, Not Can, But Will 
College Teaching Be Improved?, 1977 NEW DIRECTIONS FOR HIGHER EDUC. 1, 4 (citing a 
study indicating that ninety-four percent of college professors think that their work is 
above average); Laurie Larwood & William Whittaker, Managerial Myopia: Self-Serving 
Biases in Organizational Planning, 62 J. APPLIED PSYCHOL. 194, 194 (1977) (reporting 
that management students overestimated the likelihood that they will outperform 
competitors); see also John R. Chambers & Paul D. Windschitl, Biases in Social 
Comparative Judgments: The Role of Nonmotivated Factors in Above-Average and 
Comparative-Optimism Effects, 130 PSYCHOL. BULL. 813, 813 (2004). 
171 See Verna L. Williams, Reading, Writing, and Reparations: Systemic Reform of 
Public Schools as a Matter of Justice, 11 MICH. J. RACE & L. 419, 423 (2006) 
(“‘[I]ndividuals expect protection from the state . . . .  For the government itself to cause 
harm adds an element of outrage generally not present in purely private wrongdoing.’” 
(quoting DINAH SHELTON, REMEDIES IN INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW 50 
(1999))). 
172 LOIS MARIE GIBBS, LOVE CANAL 1 (1982). 
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government to adequately respond to the needs of its citizens.173  Risk 
events provide citizens with opportunities to assess their 
government’s ability and willingness to protect members of society.  
The signals sent by government agencies and actors following a 
disaster can have long-lasting consequences for citizen risk 
perceptions, as this Article discusses further in Section IV. 
2.  Language as a Product of Culture 
The term “cultural factors” includes a complex set of 
considerations relating to the characteristics of a population 
influenced by shared patterns of behaviors and interactions, cognitive 
constructs, and affective understanding learned through socialization 
within a particular group of people.174  Although individuals within a 
particular culture have a variety of individual experiences, 
worldviews, and belief systems, they share common social values out 
of which arise common understandings of important aspects of 
society.175 
Language is a critical factor in how individuals understand risk.176  
Language is more than the medium through which probabilities about 
outcomes is conveyed; language is a product of culture and 
subcultures and can therefore imbue new meaning in the process of 
serving as a conduit for information.  For this reason, terminology 
becomes critical.  Certain terms and phrases carry with them 
culturally defined meanings and have moral or political dimensions 
 
173 See Russell S. Sobel & Peter T. Leeson, Government’s Response to Hurricane 
Katrina: A Public Choice Analysis, 127 PUB. CHOICE 55, 56 (2006), available at 
http://www.peterleeson.com/Hurricane_Katrina.pdf; see also Larry Cox, A Movement for 
Human Rights in the United States: Reasons for Hope, 40 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 
135, 145 (2009) (citing the desire for change sparked by “the outrage over the 
abandonment of people of color during Hurricane Katrina”). 
174 The term “culture” has had many, many different definitions.  See, e.g., A.L. 
KROEBER & CLYDE KLUCKHOHN, CULTURE: A CRITICAL REVIEW OF CONCEPTS AND 
DEFINITIONS (1952) (detailing 164 separate definitions of culture). 
175 See, e.g., COMMUNICATION BETWEEN CULTURES 51 (Larry A. Samovar & Richard 
E. Porter eds., 1991) (“‘Culture is the collective programming of the mind which 
distinguishes the members of one category of people from another.’”) (quoting Geert 
Hofstede, National Cultures and Corporate Cultures (Dec. 4, 1984) (unpublished 
manuscript)); see also MULTICULTURAL EDUCATION (James A. Banks & Cherry A. 
McGee Banks eds., 1989); JOHN PAUL LEDERACH, PREPARING FOR PEACE: CONFLICT 
TRANSFORMATION ACROSS CULTURES (1995) (noting that culture is “the shared 
knowledge and schemes created and used by a set of people for perceiving, interpreting, 
expressing, and responding to the social realities around them”). 
176 See Nelkin, supra note 159, at 95. 
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that can be quite powerful.177  Semantics contribute to risk perception 
in powerful ways, particularly when language is emotive.178  
Alternatively, language is used to minimize the seriousness of a 
situation or to rob an issue of its emotional content.179  For example, 
in order to make the death penalty less frightening, advocates of the 
death penalty have developed “sterile” or “medical” terms for the 
procedure by which the state administers a death sentence.180  Vivid 
language has also been used to evoke emotions in the recipient in an 
effort to provoke certain behaviors.  For example, public health 
campaigns have used evocative language (and images) to convey 
messages about the consequences of cigarette smoking, to tout the 
benefits of breast-feeding, and to encourage safe-sex practices.181  
Previously entrenched cultural standards and values are often used 
strategically to sell the message.  For example, a breast-feeding 
campaign may draw on images of motherhood that trigger the 
culturally defined role of woman as self-sacrificing provider and 
 
177 See Susan Moeller, Jumping on the US Bandwagon for a “War on Terror,” YALE 
GLOBAL ONLINE, June 21, 2007, http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/jumping-us                  
-bandwagon-“war-terror” (reporting on a study that found that the U.S. media had reported 
on Pakistan in terms that were biased and portrayed a monolithic population, rather than 
the more accurate complex and varied culture). 
178 Patricia Greenspan, Emotions, Rationality, and Mind/Body, in PHILOSOPHY AND 
THE EMOTIONS 122 (Anthony Hatzimoysis ed., 2003) (“Affect itself essentially evaluates 
something as in some respect good or bad––good or bad for the organism (to be sought 
after or avoided), in the most primitive cases.  With cognitive development this evaluative 
content takes on the possibilities of semantical richness that we associate with 
propositions.”). 
179 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, On the Divergent American Reactions to Terrorism and 
Climate Change, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 503, 534 (2007) (“White House officials under 
President Bush asked executive officials to use the term “climate change” in preference of 
“global warming,” evidently with the belief that “climate change” is abstract and relatively 
neutral . . . .”). 
180 An example is the language typically used to describe the death penalty.  See, e.g., 
Michael Manville, Death Becomes Us: Why Americans Support Capital Punishment, 
FREEZERBOX, Sept. 13, 2000, available at http://www.freezerbox.com/archive/article 
.php?id=233 (asserting that the language we use to discuss death makes it easier for death 
penalty subjects to be used to unite the population behind a pro-death-penalty stance and 
to use the death penalty for political purposes). 
181 One example of a campaign that used rhetoric and imagery in this way arose out of 
an effort to get women to breast-feed their infants.  Joan B. Wolf, Is Breast Really Best? 
Risk and Total Motherhood in the National Breastfeeding Awareness Campaign, 32 J. 
HEALTH POL. POL’Y & L. 595, 595 (2007) (“From June 2004 to April 2006, cosponsored 
by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services and the Ad Council, the National 
Breastfeeding Awareness Campaign (NBAC) warned women that not breast-feeding put 
babies at risk for a variety of health problems.  ‘You'd never take risks before your baby is 
born.  Why start after?’ asked televised public service announcements over images of 
pregnant women logrolling and riding a mechanical bull.”). 
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protector.182  The effect of these campaigns—when they are 
successful—is often to create new associations that become fixed in 
cultural understandings. 
These cultural understandings vary from subgroup to subgroup 
within a population; subgroups often have their own set of values and 
priorities.  Subgroups can consist of members of a particular trade or 
profession, immigrant populations, ethnic or racial groups, religious 
groups, or inhabitants of particular neighborhoods or locales.183  The 
features that define the group serve as the basis for communication.  
For example, when dairy farmers exchange information, it is most 
often about aspects of the trade; when parents of children attending a 
particular school see one another at a parent-teacher organization 
meeting, they tend to talk about their children and education issues. 
One robust finding from empirical investigations of attitude 
formation is the tendency of like-minded individuals to reinforce one 
another’s beliefs.184  Group polarization occurs in the context of risk 
perception as well.  Accordingly, “a group of people who fear the 
effects of second-hand smoke, or who believe that pesticides carry 
significant risks, is likely, after discussion, to believe that the health 
dangers here are extremely serious.”185  So too, a group of people 
who tend to think similarly when it comes to environmental issues 
will be more extreme in these views after having discussed the 
issues.186  Group polarization is related to a concept called affiliation 
 
182 See Rebecca Kukla, Ethics and Ideology in Breastfeeding Advocacy Campaigns, 21 
HYPATIA 157 (2006); see also Orit Avishai, Managing the Lactating Body: The Breast-
Feeding Project and Privileged Motherhood, 30 QUALITATIVE SOC. 135 (2007). 
183 See Dora C. Lau & J. Keith Murnighan, Demographic Diversity and Faultlines: The 
Compositional Dynamics of Organizational Groups, 23 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 325, 326, 329 
(1998) (explaining that fault lines are hypothetical dividing lines that may split a group 
into subgroups based on attributes such as age, personal values, personality, race, and job 
status). 
184 See Molly J. Walker Wilson, A Behavioral Critique of Command-and-Control 
Environmental Regulation, 16 FORDHAM ENVTL. L. REV. 223, 233 (2005) (“Research 
findings have suggested that groups tend to be more extreme in their views following 
group discussion.”). 
185 Cass R. Sunstein, The Laws of Fear 14 (John M. Olin Law & Economics Working 
Paper No. 128 (2d Series)); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RISK AND REASON: SAFETY, 
LAW, AND THE ENVIRONMENT 88 (2002) (“If people tend to be concerned about global 
warming, . . . tend to believe that . . . cancer . . . lies in the use of pesticides, . . . those same 
people will tend, after discussion, to have a heightened fear of [these things].”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, The Law of Group Polarization, 10 J. POL. PHIL. 175, 176 (2002) (explaining 
how polarization occurs when members of a deliberating group move toward a more 
extreme point as a result of deliberation caused by the members’ predisposed views). 
186 Wilson, supra note 184. 
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bias, whereby experts tend to interpret scientific findings in a manner 
that benefits their employers.187  The inclination to gravitate toward 
the view of other members of a group is called affiliation bias188 and 
is evidence of irrationality in human decision making, but the 
evolutionary advantage of this tendency is clear, given that humans 
are social animals who rely on one another to unravel complex 
problems and accomplish higher tasks.  The power and prevalence of 
the affiliation bias can hardly be overstated, and its effects on risk 
responses are worthy of serious consideration. 
F.  Other Characteristics: Contextual and Temporal Factors 
1.  Contextual Factors 
Several factors exogenous to the risk and target can influence risk 
perceptions.  Strictly speaking, context, defined broadly, can be 
conceived of as similar to or the same as culture.  For example, one 
aspect of the risk context in Western societies is our system of food 
production.189  Our society has changed from one in which we were 
primarily focused on producing enough to sustain the population to an 
industrialized society in which constantly developing technologies 
provide more food, clothing, and shelter to a greater percentage of the 
population, while simultaneously introducing previously unknown 
risks.190  Technologies exert pressures on culture; cultures are shaped 
by technologies.  And, technologies are, to a large extent, supported 
 
187 See Nancy Kraus et al., Intuitive Toxicology: Expert and Lay Judgments of Chemical 
Risks, in SLOVIC, supra note 4, at 311–12. 
188 Id. at 311. 
189 See WILLIAM B. GUDYKUNST & STELLA TING-TOONEY, CULTURE AND 
INTERPERSONAL COMMUNICATION 30 (1988) (arguing that the definition of “culture” is a 
debated issue and has many different definitions in the literature, including “a script or 
schema shared by a large group of people”); see also ALLAN G. JOHNSON, THE 
BLACKWELL DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY: A USER’S GUIDE TO SOCIOLOGICAL 
LANGUAGE 73 (2d. ed., 2000) (“Culture is the accumulated store of symbols, ideas, and 
material products associated with a social system, whether it be an entire society or a 
family. . . . [I]t is one of the major elements of every social system and a key concept in 
defining the sociological perspective.”); 1 SURVEY OF SOCIAL SCIENCE: SOCIOLOGY 
SERIES 436 (Frank N. Magill ed., 1994) (“[Culture is] human traditions and customs that 
are transmitted through learning between generations.”); A DICTIONARY OF SOCIOLOGY 
47 (G. Duncan Mitchell ed., 1979) (“Culture . . . refers to that part of the total repertoire of 
human action (and its products), which is socially as opposed to genetically transmitted.”). 
190 See BECK, supra note 9, at 19 (linking the end of the “society of scarcity” with the 
advent of a new society in which novel productive forces resulted in new risks “unleashed 
to an extent previously unknown”). 
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or stifled by cultural beliefs.191  One particularly apt example is 
cloning.  Value-laden judgments about the wisdom of investing in, 
and even permitting, such a technology have influenced the state of 
the science in this area.192 
Technology can also interact with geography with interesting 
results.  In the modern, postindustrial world, pollutants generated in 
the midwestern United States travel in a predictable path to the 
northeastern states, and effluents from China threaten the well-being 
of people living in Australia.193  Some risks are geographically 
localized, and others defy geography and pose dangers to the entire 
global environment and all who inhabit it.194  Accordingly, 
geographic features and location of a population group can help to 
shape which risks become prominent to members of that society. 
2.  Temporal Factors 
Individuals become aware of potential hazards in a variety of ways.  
Sometimes the publication of a scientific study reveals a new health 
threat.195  Following an environmental disaster, the government, the 
media, and public interest groups may all communicate information 
 
191 See Roger Roots, The Dangers of Automobile Travel: A Reconsideration, 66 AM. J. 
ECON. & SOC. 959, 959 (2007) (demonstrating that despite being the leading cause of 
death, the greatest killer of children and young adults, and historically criticized by experts 
as unsafe and inefficient, the automobile has persisted due to America’s “love affair” with 
personal transportation); see also Lori Khan, Ethics Analysis of the Human Embryonic 
Stem Cell Research Debate, 5 ONLINE J. HEALTH ETHICS (2008), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1119402 (demonstrating that new technologies, like stem cell 
research, may be hotly debated and stifled due to opposition from powerful cultural 
entities, in this case religious institutions and political parties). 
192 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178 (“Risk is a bellwether in social decisions 
about technologies.”). 
193 Press Release, NASA, NASA Satellite Measures Pollution from East Asia to North 
America (Mar. 17, 2008), http://www.nasa.gov/topics/earth/features/pollution_measure 
.html; LiveScience Staff, Pollution Travels the Globe, Study Confirms, LIVESCIENCE 
(Sept. 29, 2009, 11:23 AM), http://www.livescience.com/environment/090929-foreign-
pollution.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); Michael Reilly, Air Pollution Travels, Kills 
Thousands Annually, DISCOVERY NEWS (Aug. 14, 2009), http://dsc.discovery.com/news 
/2009/08/14/air-pollution-overseas.html. 
194 See BECK, supra note 9, at 27 (citing DDT found in arctic penguins as an example of 
the globalization of risk). 
195 For example, a report on the effects of long-term exposure to bisphenol A (BPA) 
triggered concern among many, particularly parents of children, over the use of baby 
bottles and childproof plastic cups.  See NAT’L TOXICOLOGY PROGRAM, U.S. DEP’T OF 
HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., NTP-CERHR, MONOGRAPH ON THE POTENTIAL HUMAN 
REPRODUCTIVE AND DEVELOPMENTAL EFFECTS OF BISPHENOL A, NIH Publication No. 
08–5994 (2008).  Kasperson provides some examples of the types of events that can 
trigger communication about risk.  Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96. 
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about the event.196  How the first-line receivers interpret and 
subsequently communicate this information influences perceptions of 
targets multiple iterations removed.197  Thus, order effects—the 
sequence in which individuals receive the information and how initial 
recipients disseminate the information—are critical.  Because the 
initial recipients of hazard information have particular power to 
impact public perceptions, high-level officials in government, 
nongovernment organizations, and agencies have enormous influence 
in filtering information for public consumption.198 
G.  The Risk Decision Structure 
Perceptions are one thing, behaviors are quite another.  As social 
science has amply demonstrated, beliefs do not always translate into 
action.199  As empirical studies have revealed, “[A]ttitudes need not 
be related to behaviors.  If they are, then they may be trailing rather 
than leading indicators. Indeed, psychology’s self-perception theory 
tracks the ways in which people infer their attitudes from their 
 
196 The public outrage and concern following the Exxon Valdez oil spill is one example 
of an environmental disaster that triggered widespread concern over the risks posed to 
human and wildlife health by oil tankers.  Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 90, at 2200–06. 
197 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 180. 
198 James Mason discusses the role of government actors in responsible risk 
communication.  See James O. Mason, The Federal Role in Risk Communication and 
Public Education, in EFFECTIVE RISK COMMUNICATION, supra note 146, at 19 (“The 
government’s responsibility in risk communication is to help ensure that decision of public 
policy and personal practice are based on the best available information.”). 
199 See Cass R. Sunstein, Deliberative Trouble? Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 
YALE L.J. 71, 86–88 (showing that group members tend to ignore their own feelings when 
in a group, and, as a result, riskier shifts occur in judgment); see also John M. Darley & 
Bibb Latané, Bystander Intervention in Emergencies: Diffusion of Responsibility, 8 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 377, 377 (1968) (stating that rational and irrational fears 
about what might happen if they intervene, including physical harm, public 
embarrassment, involvement with police procedures, lost work days and jobs, and other 
unknown dangers, sometimes keep people from assisting in what they believe to be 
emergencies); Rob Bond & Peter B. Smith, Culture and Conformity: A Meta-Analysis of 
Studies Using Asch’s (1952b, 1956) Line Judgment Task, 119 PSYCHOL. BULL. 111 (1996) 
(analyzing a famous study demonstrating that despite believing a line to be a certain 
length, when presented with the option of conforming to statements of confederates, most 
will do so at odds with their own beliefs); Stanley Milgram, Behavioral Study of 
Obedience, 67 J. ABNORMAL AND SOC. PSYCHOL. 371 (1963) (demonstrating that despite 
an unwillingness to continue the experiment and a belief that real harm was being done, 
subjects continued to be obedient to experimenter over these beliefs); Irving L. Janis, 
Groupthink, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Nov. 1971, at 43 (showing that individuals cognitively 
ignore their own beliefs and concerns in situations in which they more highly desire group 
cohesion and cooperation and that this can lead to adverse consequences). 
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behavior (‘If I’m doing this, it must be because I like it’).”200  
Whether members of the public act in ways that are consistent with 
their purported views involves a second set of analysis and 
determinations.  For example, Sunstein has pointed out that, as in the 
case of reputational cascades, individuals often act on other people’s 
perceptions—or at least champion the “common wisdom”— 
independent of their own private attitudes.201  A full analysis of 
public risk perception requires an examination of how the decision 
structure can influence the behavior outcome in light of the adopted 
view. 
Risk perception is relevant for purposes of two categories of 
behavior-based outcomes.  One is personal practice and the other is 
public policy.202  The former is an area where risk perception can 
(although it often doesn’t) directly influence exposure to a potential 
hazard.  Public risk perception influences the latter when the public 
puts pressure on policy makers to take action in the form of 
legislation, regulation, or resource allocation, in order to influence 
perceived threats.203  In a strict dictatorship, absent a revolt or a coup, 
the discontent of the people will have little direct impact on how a 
government chooses to protect (or fails to protect) its citizens.  A 
well-functioning democracy, on the other hand, should be responsive 
to the wishes and needs of the populace.204  In the context of this type 
of political environment, public perception often—for good or for 
 
200 Baruch Fischhoff & Ilya Fischhoff, Will They Hate Us? Anticipating Unacceptable 
Risks, 3 RISK MGMT. 7, 11 (2001); see also Daryl J. Bem, Self Perception Theory, in 6 
ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 1 (Leonard Berkowitz ed., 1972); 
Russel H. Fazio, Self-Perception Theory: A Current Perspective, in 5 SOCIAL INFLUENCE: 
THE ONTARIO SYMPOSIUM 129 (Mark P. Zanna et al. eds., 1987); Daryl J. Bem, Self-
Perception: An Alternative Interpretation of Cognitive Dissonance Phenomena, 74 
PSYCHOL. REV. 183 (1967); Walter B. Cannon, The James-Lange Theory of Emotions: A 
Critical Examination and an Alternative Theory, 100 AM. J. PSYCHOL. 567 (1987) 
(explaining that emotions follow physical reactions (i.e., because my body is crying I must 
be sad)). 
201 See generally SUNSTEIN, supra note 97, at 67. 
202 See Mason, supra note 198. 
203 See generally Wilson & Fuchs, supra note 90. 
204 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the governed, that 
whenever any Form of Government becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of 
the People to alter or to abolish it, and to institute new Government, laying its Foundation 
on such Principles, and organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them shall seem most 
likely to effect their Safety and Happiness.”) 
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ill—impacts policy adoption.205  The political and power structure of 
a society becomes an important factor in whether the beliefs of the 
members of society translate to government action.  Even in the 
context of a genuine democracy, the translation of public belief to 
political action is imperfect, of course.  For one thing, democratic 
governments are rarely efficient law-making structures.206  For 
another, policy makers are influenced by the same variables as other 
members of society, but a separate, if related, set of biases may guide 
them.207  Both because the populace exerts pressure on lawmakers 
and because lawmakers are themselves members of the society, public 
risk perception is at the heart of risk policy decisions.208  But, to say 
this is not to suggest that lawmakers routinely consider the risk 
preferences of members of the population when making risk 
decisions.  Rather, the public’s influence tends to surface in a random 
and haphazard fashion, such as when a particular risk is suddenly 
brought to light, or when a particularly bad policy decision results in 
public outrage.209  The role of individual members of society need not 
 
205 See James Forman, Jr., Why Care About Mass Incarceration?, 108 MICH. L. REV. 
993 (2010) (arguing that despite failure of the tough-on-crime approach, politicians 
continue to ratchet up penalties for criminals, despite mounting evidence that such 
practices do not work, in order to win votes from a public that perceives an increase in 
crime); see also Kahan, supra note 26 (demonstrating that society may hotly debate and 
stifle new technologies, like stem cell research, due to opposition from powerful cultural 
entities, in this case religious institutions and political parties). 
206 See Forman, supra note 205 (describing public policy, influenced by a majority for 
election purposes, leading to bad outcomes); Cynthia L. Fountaine, Note, Lousy 
Lawmaking: Questioning the Desirability and Constitutionality of Legislating by Initiative, 
61 S. CAL. L. REV. 733 (1988) (demonstrating that democracy is inefficient because voters 
are ignorant, it suffers from procedural defects, there is a problem with majority tyranny, 
and it is too expensive, among other criticisms); see also Andrew B. Whitford & Soo-
Young Lee, The Efficiency and Inefficiency of Democracy in Making Governments 
Effective: Cross-National Evidence (APSA 2009 Toronto Meeting Paper, 2009), available 
at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450743 (arguing that democracy may be inefficient for 
countries suffering from the “dictator/disorder” dilemma). 
207 See W. KIP VISCUSI, FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES 
FOR RISK (1992). 
208 See Khan, supra note 191 (explaining that policy makers often make public policies 
to satisfy voters or unhappy sects, rather than using sound logic and empirical evidence); 
see also David A. Dana, A Behavioral Economic Defense of the Precautionary Principle, 
97 NW. U. L. REV. 1315, 1329–30 (2003) (pointing out that public sentiment influences 
lawmakers); Forman, supra note 205. 
209 An example of just such a situation was the response to Hurricane Katrina.  Prior to 
the destruction from the storm, the American public was largely unaware and uninformed 
about the risk presented by the potential for large-scale storms to create severe flooding 
conditions.  After August 29, 2005, when eighty percent of New Orleans was flooded, the 
media and lawmakers began to include public sentiment in the conversation.  See, e.g., 
Robert L. Glicksman, Global Climate Change and the Risks to Coastal Areas from 
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be so limited.  Members of the public are often as well equipped to 
evaluate hazards as are law and policy makers, if given access to 
pertinent information; they possess a range of talents and education 
that might be relevant to such situations, and they are heavily invested 
in such choices. 
The foregoing list of considerations represents the collective focus 
of the various theoretical perspectives to date.  The model proposed 
by this Article, which considers all of these perspectives as 
contributing to risk perception, goes far in achieving insight into this 
area but is not exhaustive.  Risk is a sufficiently ubiquitous 
phenomenon that sources of risk are theoretically infinite, and 
theories regarding foundations and sources of concern are constantly 
evolving.210  However, the factors listed here provide a solid starting 
point for a comprehensive discussion of antecedents to risk 
discernment among members of the public. 
IV 
CATEGORIES OF FACTORS INFLUENCING RISK PERCEPTION 
Individuals’ beliefs about risks are complex and rarely can be 
accurately represented in simple terms.211  The public has a broad 
concept of risk that incorporates a wide variety of considerations.  
This intricate network of factors relevant to public risk perception has 
been contrasted with the formal risk management models, which 
define riskiness based upon mortality and measured in 
probabilities.212  A careful method of examination of the risk 
perception scholarship, and a distillation of the major factors 
empirically demonstrated to influence judgments about and responses 
to dangers, yields a list of specific characteristics that can help predict 
 
Hurricanes and Rising Sea Levels: The Costs of Doing Nothing, 52 LOY. L. REV. 1127, 
1157–97 (2006) (emphasizing the importance of public reaction to Hurricane Katrina for 
future government response to the problem of climate change); see also News Hour with 
Jim Lehrer: Public Opinion After Katrina (Public television broadcast Sept. 9, 2005) 
(transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec05/opinion_9-09 
.html) (“National polls are showing a drop in public support not only for President Bush, 
but also highlighting strong disapproval of governments at all levels in their response to 
Hurricane Katrina.”). 
210 Fischhoff et al., supra note 28 (discussing two different risk approaches to a single 
risk analysis about whether a product is reasonably safe). 
211 See generally Robert E. O’Connor et al., Risk Perceptions, General Environmental 
Beliefs, and Willingness to Address Climate Change, 19 RISK ANALYSIS 461 (1999) 
(discovering a complicated relationship between individuals’ general environmental 
beliefs and their willingness to advocate for prevention in the area of climate change). 
212 See generally Slovic, supra note 37. 
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when the public will become alarmed.  At this stage of the project, 
these factors are listed, rather than being weighted.  This is significant 
because the relative strength and level of influence of these factors is 
variable and unquestionably depends upon the unique combination of 
factors making up the interaction in any given situation.213  This 
Article is designed to encourage future scholarship and commentary 
on public risk perception.  In addition, the model presented here has 
significant practical use for law and policy formation.  Understanding 
the particular antecedents to public anxiety can help risk managers 
make decisions that comport with public preferences.  Government 
officials’ having a specific set of predictors can assist in anticipating 
when widespread concern will arise and in managing public risk 
responses.  This Article proposes that risk managers should consider 
the following factors in anticipating risk perception: priming or 
inoculation; features of the risk; cultural and personal identity factors; 
additional factors, such as cost/benefit analyses and concreteness of 
the risk or the public’s ability to perceive the risk; and media 
influence. 
A.  Priming or Inoculation 
One characteristic common to large segments of a population is the 
degree to which its members have been primed or inoculated 
regarding certain potential sources of danger.  Much risk-related 
priming occurs on a wide-scale basis because sources of information 
about risks, and communication and experiences related to hazards, 
reach a broad segment of society.214  Priming describes the 
phenomenon whereby exposure to a stimulus influences the response 
to a later stimulus.215  Certain primes or triggers can help to 
determine cognitive and affective—or emotion-based—reactions to 
 
213 Results from some studies demonstrate sensitivity to context and covarying features 
that increase the difficulty in making detailed global predictions.  See e.g., RISK 
COMMUNICATION: A MENTAL MODELS APPROACH (M. Granger Morgan et al. eds., 
2002). 
214 Generally, American citizens tune into the same national nightly news and cable 
news outlets, receive information from the same major newspapers, and are protected by 
the same federal agencies. 
215 See Cialdini et al., supra note 91 (“[P]riming effects incorporate the notion of 
spreading activation, which posits that similar concepts are linked together in memory 
within a network of nodes and that activation of one concept results in the spreading of the 
activation along the network to other related concepts.”). 
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later targets or events.216  In risk perception terms, early experiences 
influence subsequent reactions to potential hazards.217  The priming 
effect is based upon the fact that early impressions last.  Put simply, 
impressions and preferences are sticky—and this is doubly so in the 
context of risk assessments.218  Priming has been discussed in terms 
of both cognitions and emotions.  Social psychologists coined the 
phrase “cognitive priming” to describe the process whereby one idea 
or practice becomes associated with other ideas or practices.219  
Priming is also an affect-based process.  The focus on affect, as a 
powerful determinant in reactions to risk-related information, has 
gained increasing attention in the legal and extra-legal scholarship.  
Emotion is a powerful element of priming perceptions of future 
potential dangers, particularly when associated with fear.220 
In risk perception literature, scholars discuss the priming of risk as 
“signaling.”  Risk researchers have suggested that to the degree a 
person associates an event with a risk, that event can act as an 
important signal.221  Paul Slovic cites the disaster at Three Mile 
Island (TMI) as a striking example of an event with high signal 
potential.222  TMI did not result in any loss of human life, yet the 
 
216 Sheila T. Murphy & Robert B. Zajonc, Affect, Cognition, and Awareness: Affective 
Priming with Optimal and Suboptimal Stimulus Exposures, 64 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 723, 723 (1993) (finding that millisecond-long encounters with negative or 
positive stimuli can produce nonspecific emotional reactions to unrelated stimuli). 
217 Empirical studies have linked fear to priming effects wherein the salience of an 
earlier event influences, or “primes,” future perception of risks.  This phenomenon occurs 
in the context of international environmental law.  See Robert W. Staiger & Frank A. 
Wolak, Differences in the Uses and Effects of Antidumping Law Across Import Sources, in 
THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF AMERICAN TRADE POLICY 385 (Anne O. Krueger ed., 
1996). 
218 See generally D.A. Sherman et al., Affective Perseverance: Cognitions Change but 
Preferences Stay the Same (paper presented at the annual meeting of the American 
Psychological Society, 1998); Paul Slovic, Rational Actors and Rational Fools: The 
Influence of Affect on Judgment and Decision-Making, 6 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 
163 (2000) (discussing the perseverance of induced preferences). 
219 See Cialdini et al., supra note 91, at 1015 (describing the influence of observed 
behavior in inducing like behavior). 
220 See Slovic, supra note 218, at 172 (discussing studies demonstrating the role of 
affect in the formation of preference); see also Sherman et al., supra note 218; Robert B. 
Zajonc, Feeling and Thinking: Closing the Debate over the Independence of Affect, in 
FEELING AND THINKING: THE ROLE OF AFFECT IN SOCIAL COGNITION 31, 49–50 (Joseph 
P. Forgas ed., 2000) (suggesting that priming is almost entirely an affective process). 
221 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28. 
222 Slovic, supra note 8, at 283.  See generally Kasperson et al., supra note 1. 
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impact of the accident was monumental.223  Widespread public fear 
and outrage occurred following the incident, resulting in serious 
consequences for the utility plant, involved regulations, and increased 
regulations on the nuclear energy industry.224  The public viewed 
TMI as signaling the disaster and danger potential of nuclear reactor, 
and the accident primed a large segment of the population to react 
with fear and distrust to nuclear energy.225 
Large-scale alarm following an event like TMI makes perfect sense 
if one thinks about the public reaction as part of a learning process: 
once the public understood that an accident like TMI was possible, 
individuals were understandably fearful of the potential for future 
disasters at nuclear reactor plants.  The reaction to hazardous 
discoveries and events, however, can be complex.  As Slovic points 
out: 
An accident that takes many lives may produce relatively little 
social disturbance . . . if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-
understood system (such as a train wreck).  However, a small 
accidence in an unfamiliar system (or one perceived as poorly 
understood), such as a nuclear reactor or a recombinant DNA 
laboratory, may have immense social consequences if it is perceived 
as a harbinger of further and possibly catastrophic mishaps.226 
Undoubtedly, certain characteristics of the risk help to determine 
its signal potential.  In the case of TMI, the involuntariness, 
unfamiliarity, and potential for catastrophe created the perfect storm.  
Such features of the risk (discussed in detail below) are important not 
only for initial perceptions of an incident but also to determine 
whether an incident will prime or signal the population, creating 
lasting attitudes about certain classes of activities. 
 
223 The Washington Post has described the accident and the aftermath.  See Mark 
Stencel, 20 Years Later: A Nuclear Nightmare in Pennsylvania, WASH. POST, Mar. 27, 
1999, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/national/longterm/tmi/tmi.htm (“Before the 
1979 accident at Pennsylvania's Three Mile Island, few had heard of the nuclear power 
plant on the Susquehanna River.”). 
224 Slovic, supra note 8, at 283–84. 
225 Id.  This growing skepticism and anxiety over nuclear power altered the future of the 
industry in the United States.  “A federal investigation, assigning blame to human, 
mechanical, and design errors, recommended changes in reactor licensing and personnel 
training, as well as in the structure and function of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.  
The accident also increased public concern over the dangers of nuclear power . . . .”  The 
Columbia Encyclopedia, Three Mile Island, ENCYCLOPEDIA.COM http://www 
.encyclopedia.com/doc/1E1-ThreeMil.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
226 Slovic, supra note 8, at 284. 
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B.  Features of the Risk 
Three Mile Island is a classic example of how certain features of a 
circumstance can signal danger to the public.  Another example is the 
fear of terrorism following September 11, 2001 (9/11).  Although 
TMI and the attacks of 9/11 were different in many respects, with 
respect to priming fear, TMI and 9/11 shared some important features.  
They were both sudden and unexpected.  They were both 
accompanied by vivid descriptions of destruction.227  The risks from 
terrorism and from the meltdown of a nuclear reactor are risks that are 
beyond the control of the average U.S. citizen.  These examples are 
stunning illustrations of how powerful certain risk characteristics can 
be in shaping public perceptions.  As central as these features of the 
risk situation were in explaining widespread fear, these characteristics 
are not important considerations for traditional risk management 
decisions, which tend to focus on quantitative assessments of 
likelihood and consequences. 
The psychometric approach has been most instrumental in 
identifying features of an activity most likely to cause concern.228  
Empirical work using survey materials has asked respondents to rank 
or rate activities for their riskiness and has then asked respondents to 
judge the activities along various dimensions.  Results typically 
consist of perceptions of riskiness of a variety of activities and 
corresponding characterizations of each of the activities.229  For 
example, one of the most important early psychometric studies on risk 
perception asked respondents to evaluate thirty activities and 
technologies with respect to the perceived benefit to society, the 
perceived risk, the acceptability of the current level of risk, and the 
risk’s position on each of nine dimensions of risk.230  Later surveys 
expanded the survey to add dimensions and revised the methodology. 
 
227 It is important to note that the TMI imagery was communicated through descriptions 
of “nuclear meltdown,” “raining radioactive material,” and “the explosion of a hydrogen 
bubble.”  The vivid images were never, fortunately, witnessed.  In contrast, the images of 
death and destruction from 9/11 were real, devastating, witnessed by millions, and still 
widely available in digital photo and video archives.  See, e.g., Attack Images & Graphics, 
SEPTEMBER11NEWS.COM, www.september11news.com/AttackImages.htm (last visited 
Sept. 30, 2011); James Nachtwey, Sept. 11, 2001: Photographs from the Archive of Time 
Photographer James Nachtwey, TIME.COM, http://www.time.com/time/photogallery 
/0,29307,1660644,00.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
228 Empirical work on risk characteristics is referred to, collectively, as the 
psychometric study of risk perception.  See supra Part I. 
229 See Slovic, supra note 8. 
230 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28, at 127. 
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Psychometric survey data has revealed some interesting patterns 
about the risks about which people are particularly concerned and the 
characteristics that trigger special consideration in risk perception.  
Respondents tend to evaluate a risk based upon factors such as how 
well the risk is understood, how controllable the risk is, and the type 
of emotion the harm triggers.231  Specifically, the early work of 
Fischhoff and colleagues found that “people are influenced by 
whether a risk is potentially catastrophic, faced by future generations, 
involuntarily incurred, uncontrollable, delayed rather than immediate, 
and particularly dreaded.”232  Paul Slovic, another pioneer in the 
psychometric method, has similarly noted that “perception of risk is 
greater for hazards whose adverse effects are uncontrollable, dread, 
catastrophic, fatal rather than injurious, not offset by compensating 
benefits, and delayed in time so the risks are borne by future 
generations.”233  Slovic and his colleagues have grouped risk features 
into two broader categories: the dread risk factor and the unknown 
risk factor.234  The dread risk factor includes the degree to which 
respondents experience feelings of dread or calm in response to the 
risk, the perceived voluntary or involuntary assumption of the risk, 
the extent to which the risk is controllable or uncontrollable, and 
whether or not they judge the risk to have catastrophic effects.235  The 
dread factor is directly related to the role of affect in risk perception, 
which this Article discusses in detail below.  The unknown risk factor 
includes characteristics, such as whether the risk is familiar or 
unfamiliar to the target, known or unknown to science, and novel or 
old.236  Several of these key characteristics of risks merit a more 
detailed discussion.237 
 
231 See Slovic, supra note 8, at 281–83. 
232 See Sunstein, supra note 179, at 521. 
233 Paul Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, in SLOVIC, supra note 
4, at 190. 
234 Slovic’s work, in particular, identified two main cognitive factors that dominate 
individuals’ perception of risk.  See generally id. 
235 Slovic, supra note 37, at 66 (“[T]he public has a broad conception of risk, qualitative 
and complex, that incorporates considerations such as uncertainty, dread, catastrophic 
potential, controllability, equity, risk to future generations, and so forth, into the risk 
equation.”). 
236 See Slovic, supra note 8, at 281–83. 
237 The 1978 Fischhoff study asked respondents to rate risks according to the following 
criteria: (1) voluntariness of risk, (2) immediacy of effect, (3) knowledge about risk by the 
targets, (4) knowledge about risk to science, (5) control over risk, (6) newness of risk, (7) 
chronic versus catastrophic, (8) common versus dreaded (“Is this a risk that people have 
learned to live with and can think about reasonably calmly, or is it one that people have 
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1.  Controllability 
The feeling of control is an important influence on human 
behavior.238  When individuals perceive that they have control over 
events, they experience less fear.239  Conversely, individuals are 
likely to view risks over which they perceive that they have little 
influence as more dangerous and less acceptable.240  Examples of 
uncontrollable hazards include airplane crashes, dangers from electric 
power, and harms from transport of hazardous materials.241  As Neal 
Feigenson notes, “Motor vehicle accidents . . . are much less dreaded 
because people think they can control their vulnerability (‘It won’t 
happen to me because I drive more safely than most people’).”242  In 
sum, “perceived lack of control is a key factor behind high risk 
perception.”243 
The control issue becomes important in particular contexts.244  
Individuals tend to see environment and technology risks as not under 
their control.  They view these types of hazards as primarily the 
responsibility of the government.245  They judge lifestyle risks, on the 
other hand, to be a matter of personal responsibility.246  Risk 
perception can also vary, depending upon who participates in a 
survey.  Certain subgroups within a population seem to be less risk 
averse, a fact that may be related to the fact that these same groups 
have a greater measure of power and control in society generally.247 
 
great dread for––on the level of a gut reaction?”), and (9) severity of consequences 
(“[H]ow likely is it that the consequence will be fatal?”).  Fischhoff et al., supra note 28, at 
131. 
238 See George Loewenstein, Out of Control: Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 272, 274 (1996). 
239 Slovic, supra note 8, at 283 (noting that “expressed preference studies have shown 
that other (perceived) characteristics such as familiarity, control . . . and level of 
knowledge also seem to influence the relation between perceived risk, perceived benefit, 
and risk acceptance”). 
240 Id. at 282 fig.1 (providing examples of psychometric data). 
241 See Loewenstein, supra note 238. 
242 Neal R. Feigenson, Emotions, Risk Perceptions and Blaming in 9/11 Cases, 68 
BROOK. L. REV. 959, 979 (2003). 
243 Paul Slovic, What’s Fear Got to Do with It? It’s Affect We Need to Worry About, 69 
MO. L. REV. 971, 988 (2004). 
244 Lennart Sjöberg, The Different Dynamics of Personal and General Risk, 5 RISK 
MGMT. 19, 27 (2003). 
245 Id. 
246 Id. at 31. 
247 White males are less risk averse than nonwhite men and women.  Slovic, supra note 
37, at 76 (“Perhaps white males see less risk in the world because they create, manage, 
control, and benefit from many of the major technologies and activities.”). 
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2.  Familiarity 
The public is less concerned about risks that are familiar (such as 
household accidents) than they are about risks that are unfamiliar 
(such as nuclear waste).248  This fact illustrates the principle that 
familiarity with a given risk mediates public fear and judgments about 
the appropriate public response to the hazard.249  The unknown-risk 
factor includes characteristics such as known–unknown to the 
individual, known–unknown to science, and new–old.250  Familiarity 
has been linked to affective components of risk perception, such as 
dread—or more informally—fear and anxiety.251  The familiarity 
effect is likely related to illusion of control, a cognitive bias that leads 
individuals to perceive that they have more control over their own 
fates and external events than they really do.252  When potential 
harms are familiar, people have the sense that knowledge of the 
factors leading to the harm and the effects of the harm, better position 
them to prevent the harm.253  There is clearly something to this 
sentiment.  When people understand risk factors, they are better able 
to educate themselves about prevention and are better prepared to 
prevent the harm.  Of course, in order to avoid the dangers, 
knowledge must lead to effective action.  Regardless, human beings 
prefer to suffer ailments that are known than those whose course and 
outcomes are unpredictable.254 
Importantly, familiarity can have contradictory effects, at times 
increasing perceptions of the likelihood of risk.  When a danger is 
cognitively available, people will be more likely to be able to bring 
instances to mind and therefore will judge the danger to be common 
or likely to occur in the future.255  This is called the availability 
 
248 Frank Baker, Risk Communication About Environmental Hazards, 11 J. PUB. 
HEALTH POL’Y 341, 346 (1990). 
249 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178. 
250 Slovic, supra note 8, at 281. 
251 Baker, supra note 248, at 346, 352 (noting circumstances and relationships between 
risks that are familiar and dreaded in regard to public preference). 
252 Slovic, supra note 8. 
253 See Paul Slovic et al., Affect, Risk, and Decision Making, 24 HEALTH PSYCHOL. 
S35, S36 (2005) (“While people may be able to ‘do the right thing’ without analysis (e.g., 
dodge a falling object) it is unlikely that they can use analytic thinking rationally without 
guidance from affect . . . [which] is essential to rational action.”). 
254 Slovic, supra note 8, at 283 fig.2 (demonstrating that generally people desire more 
regulation and protection from unknown risks as opposed to known risks). 
255 See generally Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 85 (discussing the 
availability heuristic, among other heuristics and biases). 
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heuristic, and was discussed in Part II.F.1.  Therefore, an unfamiliar 
threat, particularly if it is connected with a new, complex technology 
that is not well understood, may create more anxiety than a more 
common threat, the parameters of which are relatively well known.256  
However, very common and familiar dangers are often associated 
with more recent or frequent examples, heightening perception of 
associated harms.257  Ultimately, members of the public are least 
fearful of harms that are sufficiently familiar so as not to trigger a 
special fear associated with ambiguous and potentially disastrous 
outcomes, but not so familiar so as to be featured repeatedly in the 
media or in public discourse.  Harms such as diabetes, asthma, and 
obesity have been cited as examples of dangers that exact a toll in 
terms of human health and morbidity far greater than that which 
would be suggested by the public’s professed concern.258 
3.  Voluntariness 
People are particularly frightened by risks that are involuntary.259  
The extent to which risks associated with an activity are voluntarily 
assumed was one of the earliest hypothesized influences on risk 
judgments.260  Early psychometric investigations reinforced the idea 
that voluntarily assumed risks are more palatable to the public and 
judged to be less problematic than nonvoluntary hazards by a large 
margin.261  The voluntariness quality is related to the issue of control 
 
256 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28, at 129 fig.1, 134 fig.2 (showing that the most 
feared risks included the unknown and new technology (e.g., nuclear power, nuclear 
weapons, nerve gas, and DNA research)). 
257 For instance, one study involved showing individuals a list of well-known men and 
women, and whether male or female names appeared more frequently.  Respondents’ 
judgments regarding frequency were directly influenced by the relative fame individuals 
associated with the names.  When shown lists featuring well-known men but not well-
known women, respondents believed that men’s names appeared more frequently.  
However, when presented with lists in which the women were the more famous, people 
judged women’s names to appear more often. 
258 Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Precautionary Principle, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1003, 
1016 (2003) (noting the relative lack of concern among Americans over health risks 
stemming from obesity); see also Sarah Lichtenstein et al., Judged Frequency of Lethal 
Events, 4 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOL.: HUMAN LEARNING & MEMORY 551, 552 (1978) 
(noting that certain causes of death (accidents, homicides, tornadoes, fires, and cancer) 
were relatively overestimated, while others (stroke, diabetes, tuberculosis, asthma) were 
underestimated). 
259 See Slovic et al., supra note 130. 
260 Chauncey Starr posited that the public accepts a risk that is 1000 times greater when 
the risk is voluntarily assumed versus when the danger is imposed upon individuals.  Starr, 
supra note 46, at 1237. 
261 See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28, at 143 tbl.3. 
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and reinforces the notion that when members of the public perceive 
that they have control over exposure to potential harms, they are less 
fearful.262  The prevalence of the voluntariness characteristic of risk 
in risk perception scholarship points to its robust influence on the 
public’s normative judgments about harms. 263 
Certain theoretical perspectives place particular emphasis on this 
characteristic.  One example is the revealed-preferences theory, which 
advocates an historical examination of the use of certain technologies 
to gauge the acceptability of certain risks and risk characteristics.264  
According to Chauncey Starr’s research, individuals appear willing to 
accept risks posed by voluntary activities (e.g., skiing, driving a car, 
traveling by commercial jet) about one thousand times greater than 
they would tolerate from involuntary sources (e.g., food preservatives, 
nuclear energy, natural disasters) that provide the same level of 
benefit.265  Slovic and his colleagues, using a nonhistorical survey 
methodology, found that respondents preferred somewhat higher risk 
levels for voluntary, as opposed to involuntary, activities.266  
Although Starr’s initial estimates of preference for voluntary risks 
appear high (a survey of studies has revealed that voluntary risks are 
preferred by a factor of one hundred to one thousand), choice in 
exposure to risk remains an important factor in risk analysis.267 
4.  Catastrophic Potential 
Whether the risk carries with it the potential for catastrophe is 
another important consideration.268  A definition of catastrophic is the 
potential “to affect many people at the same time.”269  Research has 
revealed that respondents are less tolerant of risks carrying the 
potential for catastrophe than traditional risk analysis or “rational 
theory” would predict.  Specifically, individuals would prefer a 
 
262 Slovic, supra note 8, at 283 (“[H]azards judged to be ‘voluntary’ tend also to be 
judged as ‘controllable.’”). 
263 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178; see also Fischhoff et al., supra note 28. 
264 Starr, supra note 46, at 1235 (“Several major features of the benefit-risk relations are 
apparent, the most obvious being the difference by several orders of magnitude in 
society’s willingness to accept ‘voluntary’ and ‘involuntary’ risk.  As one would expect, 
we are loathe to let others do unto us what we happily do to ourselves.”). 
265 Id. at 1237–38. 
266 Id. at 1235. 
267 D. Litai et al., The Public Perception of Risk, in THE ANALYSIS OF ACTUAL VERSUS 
PERCEIVED RISKS 213, 219 (Vincent T. Covello et al. eds., 1981). 
268 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178. 
269 Sunstein, supra note 179, at 506. 
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certain loss of a relatively small number of lives over a period of 
years than a small risk of a large number of lives at a single point in 
time.270  The public reportedly perceives risks with catastrophic 
potential as up to fifty times more risky than noncatastrophic risks.  
Moreover, surveys have revealed that the public prefers voluntary 
risks by a factor of one hundred to one thousand.271  This may also be 
related to the issue of perceived control and status quo.272  The 
“natural” state of affairs is more similar to a small loss of a number of 
lives over an extended period of time.  Human beings suffer various 
ailments that compromise health and shorten lives due to familiar 
causes like heart disease, cancer, liver disease, diabetes, respiratory 
disease, and accidents.  Although death by these means is no less 
tragic than death by other means, members of the public are used to 
loss of life through these means.  In contrast, catastrophic loss 
involving sudden loss of multiple lives strike individuals as 
particularly upsetting.273  Examples of such catastrophic losses 
include those incurred following plane crashes, explosions, and 
natural disasters.  Because they are fairly rare, they are unfamiliar, 
and because they result in multiple lives lost, they induce a level of 
fear that is out of proportion with the level of fear that would be 
predicted by standard rational choice theory.274  Risks assumed on an 
individual level, such as those posed by cigarette smoking, alcohol 
consumption, and driving a motor vehicle are less fear inducing, in 
part, because the consequences of these risks are rarely 
catastrophic.275 
Another characteristic of risk related to catastrophic potential is the 
reversibility of associated harms.  Not surprisingly, individuals are 
more concerned about risks they perceive to have long-term and 
potentially irreversible effects.276  The qualities of being catastrophic 
 
270 This tendency is irrational because it means that under certain circumstances, people 
will choose an option that results in a greater statistical loss of life.  This expressed 
preference is at odds with our general understanding of attitudes about risk and traditional 
risk theory. 
271 Litai et al., supra note at 267. 
272 See Slovic, supra note 8. 
273 Disasters, INFOPLEASE (2007), http://www.infoplease.com/ipa/A0001437.html (last 
visited Sept. 30, 2011) (listing disasters by year, including the highly publicized 2010 oil 
spill). 
274 See supra Part II. 
275 Torbjørn Rundmo, Associations Between Affect and Risk Perception, 5 J. RISK RES. 
119, 134 (2002). 
276 Fischhoff & Fischhoff, supra note 200. 
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and being irreversible have been an indication for the need to take 
extra precautions for countries and governments no less than 
individuals.277  The 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development asserts, “In order to protect the environment, the 
precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States according to 
their capabilities.  Where there are threats of serious or irreversible 
damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason 
for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental 
degradation.”278  Calls to replace traditional risk analysis have 
integrated these concerns over the potential for an increasing pace of 
technological ingenuity to outpace careful investigation and 
understanding of potential effects having irreversible consequences, 
with implications for current and future generations.279 
5.  Equity 
Less ubiquitous, but still present in the psychometric literature, is 
the concern citizens have regarding the potential for inequitable 
distribution of risks.  Particularly prevalent is the worry that 
historically disadvantaged members of the population are 
disproportionately exposed to harm.  The unequal exposure to risk of 
a particular identifiable population may trigger outrage and 
indignation, depending upon the history and perceived vulnerability 
of the group.280  Beck draws a connection between the modern 
 
277 Cass R. Sunstein, Irreversible and Catastrophic, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 841, 841 
(2006) (“When a harm is irreversible, and when regulators lack information about its 
magnitude and likelihood, they should purchase an “option” to prevent the harm at a later 
date––the Irreversible Harm Precautionary Principle.  This principle brings standard option 
theory to bear on environmental law and risk regulation.  And when catastrophic outcomes 
are possible, it makes sense to take special precautions against the worst-case scenarios––
the Catastrophic Harm Precautionary Principle.”). 
278 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Rio de Janeiro, 
Braz., June 3–14, 1992, Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. A/ 
CONF.151/26/Rev.1 (Vol. I), Princ. 15 (Aug. 12, 1992). 
279 See Bruna De Marchi, Public Participation in Risk Governance, 30 SCI. & PUB. 
POL’Y 171, 174 (2003) (“To this end, progress is necessary in constructing new methods 
of decision-making, which include not only revised structures, but also innovative modes 
of thinking, communicating, and interacting.  In this context, risk governance is to be 
conceived in more inclusive terms than the usual dichotomy risk assessment/risk 
management.  As past experience has shown, catastrophic and often irreversible effects of 
(old and new) technologies might be anticipated.” (internal footnote omitted)). 
280 Examples of perceived inequity can often be found by examining various media 
outlets.  See, e.g., Rapper Kanye West Denounces Bush Response, American Media at 
Hurricane Relief Telethon, WIKINEWS, Sept. 3, 2005, http://en.wikinews.org/wiki/Rapper 
_Kanye_West_denounces_Bush_response,_American_media_at_hurricane_relief_telethon 
(showing an African American man accusing the president of not caring about black 
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allocation of risk and outcome with “legitimate” methods of wealth 
distribution.281  Risks, like resources, profoundly affect quality of life, 
and, like resources, risks are virtually never uniformly distributed 
across all segments of society.282  Dangers threaten the lives, health, 
and property of members of society, but they may also jeopardize 
psychological security, freedoms, and interpersonal relationships.283  
Nowhere is this more relevant than in situations in which members of 
society are systematically and disproportionately subjected to 
particular types of risks.284  A prominent example is the 
environmental justice movement in which a rising tide of concern and 
unrest has led to efforts to reshape environmental policy.285 
Publications written for risk management professionals or for 
governmental agencies commonly caution against ignoring potentially 
discriminatory practices and selective protection.  The Environmental 
Protection Agency, for example, has published material suggesting 
that much of the debate over environmental degradation has related to 
questions of who has power to affect decisions and how this might 
implicate issues of fairness and equality.  This work provides specific 
advice based on the work of various risk perception experts.286  The 
Environmental Protection Agency has endorsed the systematic 
examination of potentially unequal exposure to pollutants across 
various disadvantaged communities.287  Widespread concern over 
inequalities in environmental protections has led to organizing efforts 
 
people in the wake of Hurricane Katrina); Race an Issue in Katrina Response, CBS NEWS, 
Feb. 11, 2009, http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2005/09/03/katrina/main814623.shtml 
(detailing issues with race and Hurricane Katrina). 
281 BECK, supra note 9, at 19. 
282 Id. at 41 (“There is a systematic ‘attraction’ between extreme poverty and extreme 
risk.”). 
283 See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96 (discussing the potential impacts 
on human well-being and social structures posed by risks). 
284 See BECK, supra note 9, at 23 (discussing “social risk positions”). 
285 See generally Dorceta E. Taylor, The Rise of the Environmental Justice Paradigm: 
Injustice Framing and the Social Construction of Environmental Discourses, 43 AM. 
BEHAV. SCIENTIST 508 (2000) (detailing the ways in which the community-based 
environmental justice movement has influenced environmental research and policy). 
286 See PETER M. SANDMAN, EXPLAINING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK (1986); see also 
BARRY L. JOHNSON, IMPACT OF HAZARDOUS WASTE ON HUMAN HEALTH: HAZARD, 
HEALTH EFFECTS, EQUITY, AND COMMUNICATIONS ISSUES 33 (1999). 
287 See, e.g., U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, ENVIRONMENTAL EQUITY: REDUCING RISK 
FOR ALL COMMUNITIES 31–36 (1992); 
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in order to heighten awareness and advance more progressive policies 
and practices.288 
C.  Cultural and Personal Identity Factors 
Cultural approaches to risk perception and assessment have had 
two general foci.  The first is the role that the individual’s worldview 
takes in his or her experience of risk.289  The second is the role of 
emotion (or affect) on risk perception.290  The idea that culture-based 
studies identify individual differences that might influence risk 
perception may seem incongruous given that the study of culture is 
usually a study of socially cultivated understandings common to a 
group of people.291  However, the importance of an individual’s 
worldview is a common emphasis in the cultural definition of risk 
response so that individual variations in worldviews assume relevance 
for purposes of risk evaluations.292  Emotional reactions to dangers, 
although they are sometimes treated as exogenous to cultural 
worldview, are actually manifestations of those views or 
preferences.293  The new methodology this Article proposes first 
considers emotional reactions to danger and then looks at worldview 
to evaluate risk perception. 
 
288 One example was the First National People of Color Environmental Leadership 
Summit in Washington, D.C., in 1991.  For this and other examples, see SECOND 
NATIONAL PEOPLE OF COLOR ENVIRONMENTAL LEADERSHIP SUMMIT, ENVIRONMENTAL 
JUSTICE TIMELINE––MILESTONES (2002), available at http://www.ejrc.cau.edu/summit2 
/%20EJTimeline.pdf.  See also Vicki Been, What's Fairness Got to Do with It: 
Environmental Justice and the Siting of Locally Undesirable Land Uses, 78 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1001 (1993); Robert D. Bullard & Beverly Hendrix Wright, The Politics of 
Pollution: Implications for the Black Community, 47 PHYLON 71, 78 (1986). 
289 See Kahan et al., supra note 130, at 1072 (“A growing body of work suggests that 
cultural worldviews permeate all of the mechanisms through which individuals apprehend 
risk, including their emotional appraisals of putatively dangerous activities, their 
comprehension and retention of empirical information, and their disposition to trust 
competing sources of risk information.”). 
290 Although the terms “emotion” and “affect” have received disparate treatment, 
particularly in the psychological literature, this Article refers to them interchangeably.  
There is some precedent for using these terms in this fashion.  See James M. Jasper, The 
Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions In and Around Social Movements, 
13 SOC. F. 397, 405 (1998) (discussing types of emotion as a subset of, but not a synonym 
for, “affect”); see also Susan A. Bandes, Response, Emotions, Values, and the 
Construction of Risk, 156 U. PA. L. REV. PENNUMBRA 421, 424 n.13 (2008) (“The terms 
‘emotion’ and ‘affect’ are sometimes used interchangeably and sometimes to connote 
different concepts.  Neither has a single accepted meaning.”). 
291 See supra Part I. 
292 Kahan et al., supra note 130, at 1072. 
293 Id. 
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1.  Emotions 
A significant debate has centered on the question of whether 
emotions play an adaptive or maladaptive role in risk evaluation.294  
There are two fundamental ways in which human beings comprehend 
risk: the analytic system and the experiential system.  One relies upon 
effortful calculations, algorithms, rules of logic, and calculating risk 
probabilities in solving problems and formulating choices.295  This 
system is “relatively slow, effortful, and requires conscious 
control.”296  The experiential system relies on intuition and is “fast, 
mostly automatic, and not very accessible to conscious awareness.”297  
The experiential system relies upon a combination of what we might 
call “instinct” and learned behaviors.  Most choices made by human 
beings are formulated using this system.  Affective reactions to 
various situations provide information about whether that situation, 
and features of that situation, should be avoided.  Positive emotions 
like feelings of calm, safety, and familiarity lead to one set of decision 
outcomes, while negative emotions such as dread, uncertainty, and 
fear lead to a different set of choices.298 
Proponents of formal risk analysis tend to view affective responses 
to risk as across-the-board irrational.  Current wisdom disputes this 
view.  The rational, or analytic, system and the experiential, or affect-
based, system are complementary; each depends upon the other for 
guidance.299  Studies have demonstrated that analytic reasoning 
cannot be effective unless emotion and affect guide it.300  According 
to Slovic, 
[V]arious studies demonstrate that affect is a strong conditioner of 
preference, whether or not the cause of that affect is consciously 
perceived.  They also demonstrate the independence of affect from 
cognition, indicating that there may be conditions of affective or 
emotional arousal that do not necessarily require cognitive 
 
294 Id. at 1073–74. 
295 See generally Paul Slovic et al., Risk as Analysis and Risk as Feelings: Some 
Thoughts About Affect, Reason, Risk, and Rationality, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 311 (2004). 
296 Id. 
297 Id. 
298 Id.; see also MARTHA C. NUSSBAUM, UPHEAVALS OF THOUGHT: THE 
INTELLIGENCE OF EMOTIONS 19, 20 (2001); George F. Loewenstein et al., Risk as 
Feelings, 127 PSYCHOL. BULL. 267, 267 (2001) (offering “an alternative theoretical 
perspective, the risk-as-feelings hypothesis, that highlights the role of affect experienced at 
the moment of decision making”). 
299 Slovic et al., supra note 295. 
300 Id. 
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appraisal.  This affective mode of response, unburdened by 
cognition and hence much faster, has considerable adaptive 
value.301 
Judgments of potential sources of harms are highly correlated with 
emotional valence, as measured by respondent ratings on scales such 
as good/bad, nice/awful, and dread/not dread.302  These empirical 
results suggest the importance not only of analytic evaluations of an 
activity or a technology but also of affective reactions to that activity.  
While some have argued that emotions are simply a byproduct of 
reason-based decisions about risk,303 findings largely refute this 
possibility, suggesting that emotional reactions come first and that 
effortful reasoning processes supplement or justify initial affective 
reactions.304  Moreover, emotion-based evaluations can lead to 
optimal decision making.  Findings from psychological studies on 
choice formation suggest that decision makers often optimize 
outcomes when they stick with initial “gut” judgments.305  Analyzing 
costs and benefits of various courses of action can lead to decisions 
that people later regret, and those that are inconsistent with later 
behavior and preferences.306 
Even if emotions do not consistently serve as optimal cues for risk-
decision purposes, they may serve as signals for personal beliefs that 
have enormous value to the human being who holds them.307  The 
value of affective reactions is explicit in the cultural evaluator model 
advanced by Dan Kahan, discussed in Part II.E of this Article.  The 
cultural evaluator model of risk perception views emotional responses 
to risk as reflective of an individual’s culturally defined, expressive 
 
301 Slovic, supra note 218, at 172. 
302 Early psychometric studies of risk perception showed that feelings of dread were the 
major determinant of public perception and acceptance of risk for a wide range of hazards.  
See Fischhoff et al., supra note 28; Slovic, supra note 8. 
303 See Kahan, supra note 26, at 746. 
304 See Slovic, supra note 218, at 172. 
305 See TIMOTHY D. WILSON, STRANGERS TO OURSELVES: DISCOVERING THE 
ADAPTIVE UNCONSCIOUS 170 (2002). 
306 Id.  The fact that affective responses have a useful function in risk response does not 
mean that emotions never prevent optimal decision making.  Unquestionably, emotions 
can prevent consideration of all relevant factors in a decision-making situation or can 
cause individuals to rush to judgment.  Moreover, because emotions are so prevalent in 
risk decisions, people are especially vulnerable to manipulation by parties with vested 
interests who use emotional appeals or fear tactics to motivate future judgments. 
307 See NUSSBAUM, supra note 298 (“Emotions . . . involve judgments about important 
things . . . in which, appraising an external object as salient for our own well-being, we 
acknowledge our own neediness and incompleteness before parts of the world that we do 
not fully control.”). 
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evaluation of potential dangers.308  According to Kahan, “When 
people draw on their emotions to judge the risk that such an activity 
poses, they form an expressively rational attitude about what it would 
mean for their cultural worldviews for society to credit the claim that 
that activity is dangerous and worthy of regulation . . . .”309  The 
cultural evaluator model rejects both the neoclassical-economic-
rational-actor model (which claims that risk decisions involve 
analytical optimization strategies) and the behavioral-decision-theory 
model (which views emotions as biases).310 
Instead of taking a pessimistic view of affect, cultural evaluator 
theory views emotion as signaling underlying values, which 
themselves have worth.311  In sum, “emotional responses to risk can 
be understood as tools, guiding the individual toward decisions that 
serve deeply held values and preferences . . . .  It is not, after all, 
irrational for members of society to care about meanings and not just 
about consequences and to form positions on risk that express their 
cultural values.”312  As Kahan points out, “individuals’ decisions to 
forgo or forbear risks is based not on the expected utility of those 
actions but on their social meanings, which are unlikely to be tied in 
any systematic way to the actuarial magnitude of those risks.”313  
Emotions are highly dependent upon other features of the risk 
context.314  When there is a known, hated perpetrator or when there is 
an act that is outrageous, there will be more agitation, perhaps not out 
of fear per se, but out of a hybrid of fear and loathing for the source 
of the fear.315  A recent example from American history is Osama bin 
Laden.316 
2.  Cultural Worldviews 
There are two ways of categorizing characteristics of the risk 
perceiver in terms of worldview.  The first is based upon demographic 
 
308 See generally Kahan, supra note 26. 
309 Id. at 750–51. 
310 See id. at 749 (noting that the cultural evaluator theory offers a much different 
account of how emotions enter the cognition of risk than the irrational weigher theory). 
311 See id. at 748–49. 
312 Wilson, supra note 123, at 1307; accord Kahan, supra note 26, at 758. 
313 Kahan, supra note 26, at 754. 
314 Id. at 741. 
315 Id. at 746. 
316 See Deborah A. Small & George Loewenstein, The Devil You Know: The Effects of 
Identifiability on Punishment, 18 J. BEHAV. DECISION MAKING 311, 313 (2005) 
(discussing the common urge to exact revenge upon identifiable wrongdoers). 
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information.317  The second involves what cultural-risk scholars call 
cultural-worldview typology.318  Proponents of this typology believe 
that a person’s moral or philosophical approach to the world guides 
that person’s risk preferences.319  By defining people as high or low 
on control (grid) and social commitment (group), the cultural 
worldview typology makes certain predictions about how individuals 
will form judgments about a wide range of potential dangers.320 
Members of society who have hierarchic orientations tend to accept 
risks, provided that government authorities or other authoritarian 
experts legitimate the risk; they are, however, deeply distrustful of 
risks that threaten the social order.321  Egalitarians, on the other hand, 
reject risks imposed by a small group on a large group, particularly 
when those in authority impose them and when they will affect future 
generations.322  Fatalists have low sympathy for group attachment but 
a strong orientation toward socially assigned classifications, and 
individualists tend to reject social structures and group attachment.323  
Orientation toward the group is hypothesized to have profound 
influences on risk perception.324  Individual worldviews might also 
interact with risk characteristics.  For example, there is some thought 
that personality variables influence an individual’s degree of concern 
over the potential for catastrophic outcomes generally.325 
 
317 See MARY DOUGLAS, NATURAL SYMBOLS 54–68 (1970). 
318 See id. 
319 See id. 
320 See DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2, at 138–39; see also Susanne Rippl, 
Cultural Theory and Risk Perception: A Proposal for a Better Measurement, 5 J. RISK 
RES. 147, 149 (2002). 
321 See generally DOUGLAS & WILDAVSKY, supra note 2. 
322 See id. at 126 (“[T]hose organized on voluntaristic, egalatarian principles will make 
the sectarian selection of risks and justify their view of danger.”). 
323 Id. at 99, 101; see also Rippl, supra note 320. 
324 See Steve Rayner, Cultural Theory and Risk Analysis, in SOCIAL THEORIES OF RISK 
83, 87 (Sheldon Krimsky & Dominic Golding eds., 1992). 
325  See Marris et al., supra note 5, at 640 (“Egalitarians, for example, are predicted to 
be more concerned about large-scale environmental risks with potentially catastrophic 
consequences such as nuclear power and ozone depletion, whereas individualists would 
consider these risks to have been exaggerated, and hierarchists should be most concerned 
about social issues such as mugging and terrorism which threaten their sense of order and 
security.”).  For more on the cultural view, see Aaron Wildavsky & Karl Dake, Theories of 
Risk Perception: Who Fears What and Why? 119 RISK 41 (1990). 
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3.  Self-Relevance 
One unsurprising finding is that the more relevant a particular 
hazard is to a certain subgroup, the more concern members of that 
group express about that risk.  For example, research has found that 
age-related illnesses seem particularly threatening to respondents of 
advanced age.326  Certain populations within a society assign higher 
importance to some risks than other groups, based upon a shared 
vulnerability to associated risks.327  Such groups often mobilize in an 
attempt to gain attention and resources for the adoption of risk 
reduction in areas the group perceives as important for one reason or 
another.328  One category of risk that is particularly relevant to large 
segments of the population is those risks likely to be catastrophic in 
nature.329  The self-relevance feature may help to explain why 
catastrophic risks––or those risks perceived as catastrophic––are more 
likely to cause widespread panic.330  A lack of perceived self-
relevance may also explain why some serious risks receive 
surprisingly little attention.  An example is climate change.331  Until 
recently, climate change received relatively little public attention.  
Climate change is a harm that is difficult to experience personally.  
No doctor will diagnose a patient with climate change and give the 
patient six months to live.  Because natural disasters tend to be 
localized, people rarely connect dramatic weather events (which do 
have relevance to members of the population) with global climate 
change. 
D.  Additional Relevant Features of the Risk Context 
A number of additional aspects of the risk situation are relevant in 
predicting which types of harms will cause individuals particular 
anxiety.  These features do not fit easily into the aforementioned 
categories, and yet they are significant considerations and germane to 
any attempt to construct an effective risk-perception prediction 
model. 
 
326 Marris et al., supra note 5, at 639. 
327 See Sunstein, supra note 277, at 852. 
328 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178 (“[V]arious groups present competing 
evidence based upon their own perceptions and social agenda.”). 
329 Id. 
330 Sunstein, supra note 277, at 841; see also Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 178. 
331 Slovic, supra note 8, at 282 fig.1. 
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1.  Benefits of Activity / Cost of Precautions 
Traditional risk analysis features the benefits associated with a 
potentially harmful activity as a central consideration.  Later attempts 
to determine social acceptability also made benefits a pivotal feature 
of risk assessment.332  Although experts who engage in cost-benefit 
analysis diverge from the public substantially with respect to some 
criteria for risk response, both experts and members of the public care 
about the benefit associated with a risk.  Ultimately, the public will 
accept more risk for activities that are more beneficial.333  
Conversely, if individuals perceive that they will have to make 
personal sacrifices in order to reduce the chance of a potential danger 
materializing, they may well profess less concern about the danger.334  
The importance of realized benefits to the acceptability of risks may 
be captured at least indirectly by the measure of voluntariness.335  As 
Frank Cross points out, “The voluntary acceptance of risk helps 
ensure that the same group incurs both the risk and the benefit of an 
activity (otherwise the community bearing the risk is unlikely to 
voluntarily accept it).  An involuntarily borne risk, by contrast, may 
compel one group to accept the risk, while others benefit.”336 
2.  Concreteness or Cognitive Availability 
Behavioral researchers call the human tendency to “place more 
weight on concrete, emotionally interesting information than on more 
probative abstract data” the vividness bias.337  As previously 
mentioned, facilitators frequently use vivid language to evoke 
emotions and increase cognitive recall, making the technique of using 
dramatic examples and detailed descriptions common in a variety of 
 
332 See Starr, supra note 46. 
333 Fischhoff et al., supra note 28, at 148–51; see also Susan G. Hadden, Public 
Perception of Hazardous Waste, 11 RISK ANALYSIS 47, 48 (1991). 
334 Sunstein, supra note 179, at 507 (“To the extent that people understand that they are 
themselves contributors to climate change, they are inclined to diminish the magnitude of 
the threat.”). 
335 See SUSAN G. HADDEN, A CITIZEN’S RIGHT TO KNOW 137 (1989) (“[Public use of 
risk is] a much richer concept that involves balancing benefits against unwanted outcomes 
and also involves some sense of the fairness of the activities that create the risk.”); see also 
Frank B. Cross, The Public Role in Risk Control, 24 ENVTL. L. 887, 926 (1994) (“An 
activity with substantial perceived benefits will, on balance, be considered to be less risky.  
Because the risk appears more worthwhile, it consequently seems less great.”). 
336 Cross, supra note 335, at 915. 
337 See RICHARD NISBETT & LEE ROSS, HUMAN INFERENCE: STRATEGIES AND 
SHORTCOMINGS OF SOCIAL JUDGMENT 55–61 (1980). 
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forums and for a range of purposes.  The European Union, for 
example, has required cigarette packages to feature images of 
diseased lungs.338 
Certain types of occurrences provide fertile ground for subsequent 
vivid accounts.  Dramatic environmental events, such as natural 
disasters, have received the lion’s share of attention, while other, 
arguably more harmful environmental processes have gone relatively 
unnoticed.339  The visual impact and subsequent mental imagery of a 
danger influences the cognitive availability of a risk.  Some risks lend 
themselves to cognitive indelibility.  For example, “the impact of 
seeing a house burning on the subjective probability of such accidents 
is probably greater than the impact of reading about a fire in the local 
paper.”340 
The vividness bias and the availability heuristic are related, in that 
vivid depictions of events make examples of such events more 
 
338 See Paul Meller, Gag Order: EU Law’s Graphic Tobacco Warnings, INT’L HERALD 
TRIBUNE, Mar. 1, 2001, http://lists.essential.org/pipermail/intl-tobacco/2001q1/000426 
.html.  Other, similar campaigns have been launched and promulgated with substantial aid 
from such methods.  See e.g., Danielle Bean, Is this Pro-Life Ad too Graphic?, NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REG. (Feb. 5, 2010, 9:00 AM), http://www.ncregister.com/blog/is_this_pro-life 
_ad_too_graphic/ (identifying a graphic campaign for anti-abortionists with strategic use 
of vivid pictures and language); Heather McCracken, Graphic Ad Tackles Drink-Drivers, 
NEW ZEALAND HERALD, June 21, 2009, http://www.nzherald.co.nz/road-safety/news 
/article.cfm?c_id=308&objectid=10579763 (using a graphic television commercial to 
prevent drunk driving). 
339 See Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 707; Sunstein, supra note 102 (noting that 
cascade effects caused by the availability heuristic can produce a public demand for 
regulation even though the relevant risks are trivial, while producing little or no demand 
for regulation of risks that are large in magnitude); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous 
Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 217, 241 (1993) [hereinafter 
Sunstein, Endogenous]; Charles Yablon, The Meaning of Probability Judgments: An Essay 
on the Use and Misuse of Behavioral Economics, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. 899, 936 (“If 
people are mistaken about the fatalities associated with various activities, then they are 
likely to favor overexpenditure of funds to prevent damage from [less dangerous hazards] 
while underfunding efforts to reduce [more dangerous hazards], which they view as less 
dangerous.”); cf. Robert S. Adler, Flawed Thinking: Addressing Decision Biases in 
Negotiation, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 683, 701 n.56 (2005) (“In some cases, 
[policy makers] may be prodded to regulate insignificant risks, and in others they may face 
apathy in promoting public health measures.”). 
340 Tversky & Kahneman, Judgment, supra note 85.  Other serious risks whose effects 
will occur over a long period of time and whose dangers lack vividness command less 
attention.  Sunstein has written about climate change: “No salient event heightens public 
concern, and indeed most people lack personal experience that would make the relevant 
risks seem immediate or even real as opposed to speculative and hypothetical.”  Sunstein, 
supra note 179, at 507. 
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cognitively available.341  Historical illustrations make the point best.  
As Cass Sunstein has noted, “With respect to terrorism, the attacks of 
9/11 are highly salient, in a way that is likely to lead people to 
perceive a strong likelihood of a future attack or perhaps to neglect 
the question of probability altogether, focusing instead on the worst 
that might happen.”342  In contrast, some hazards are inconspicuous, 
slow to develop, and subtle as their approach.  An example is slow-
growing cancers.343  The risk from such cancers is very serious and 
may be statistically more devastating than other types of risks.344  
However, because the danger is less dramatic and the effects are 
hidden and less vivid, this type of harm is less easily brought to mind 
than other types of harms, such as tsunamis, tornados, and other 
dramatic weather events, plane crashes, and explosions.345  The latter 
categories of events are not only easier to retrieve, but also they 
involve images that are prone to slow cognitive decay.346 
E.  The Media and Risk Perception 
What the media chooses to report has important implications for 
how members of society perceive risks.347  The infamous Love Canal 
situation has been cited as an example of the media’s powerful role in 
shaping public perception.348  Initially, alarming reports caused 
widespread concern, and subsequent attempts by nonmedia 
spokespersons and experts to revise initial estimates of harm were 
 
341 For more on the availability heuristic, see Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685–
91.  See also Jolls, supra note 87; Jolls et al., supra note 84, at 1519; Korobkin & Ulen, 
supra note 87; Pidot, supra note 87; Sunstein, supra note 87. 
342 Sunstein, supra note 179, at 507. 
343 Carcinoid is a slow-growing type of neuroendocrine tumor.  CARCINOID CANCER 
FOUND., FOR PATIENTS: NEWLY DIAGNOSED: THE BASICS, http://www.carcinoid.org 
/content/newly-diagnosed-basics (last visited Sept. 30, 2011). 
344 Sunstein, supra note 179, at 541. 
345 Kuran & Sunstein, supra note 23, at 685–91. 
346 See Howard Eichenbaum & Norbert Fortin, Episodic Memory and the 
Hippocampus: It’s About Time, 12 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN PSYCHOL. SCI. 53, 53 (2003) 
(“Episodic memory refers to the capacity to mentally reexperience a previous occasion in 
one’s life. . . .  [It has] a special capacity for the recollection of specific personal 
experiences.”). 
347 Altheide, supra note 13, at 664 (arguing that the media has the power to influence 
public perceptions of risk). 
348 Eric R. Pogue, The Catastrophe Model of Risk Regulation and the Regulatory 
Legacy of Three Mile Island and Love Canal, 15 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 472–77 
(2007) (giving a detailed description of regulation before the Love Canal incident, the 
incident itself, and the response to the incident). 
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ineffective in reassuring the public.349  Media players can act as risk 
communication facilitators in the same way that famous personalities 
and organized public interest groups can.  Moreover, so-called 
availability entrepreneurs of all stripes utilize mass media outlets to 
spread their message. 
1.  Constraints and Goals of the Media 
The news media is constrained by three factors: deadlines, resource 
limitations, and geographical factors.350  At times the realities of a 
developing story and a firm deadline force journalists to file a partial 
story that might not include all of the important details or might not 
even provide the most relevant details of the story, depending upon 
whether journalists gather the bulk of the information after a 
deadline.351  Newspapers face the most difficult deadline constraints, 
while deadlines have less effect on radio, television, and the 
Internet.352 
As with any industry, media outlets have specific goals.  General 
goals for media include constructing audiences and maximizing 
profits.353  Like any other industry, the media seeks to make a 
profit354 by decreasing expenses and increasing revenue.355  Although 
advertising is the most effective method for increasing revenue, 
another strategy for increasing profit is to grow audience size by 
increasing the attractiveness of content.356  The most direct way of 
augmenting audience size is to adopt a marketing perspective, paying 
special attention to the types of stories that will generate the largest 
 
349 See Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 184. 
350 See W. JAMES POTTER, MEDIA LITERACY 103–05 (3d ed. 2005). 
351 Id. (providing an example of this situation regarding morning newspapers).  
Journalists typically will have a deadline the night before; therefore, any information 
gathered after that deadline cannot be included in the next morning edition of the 
newspaper.  The editor of the paper will then have to make the decision whether to include 
the information in the next day’s paper.  If she does so then the information is old news 
and the audience surely is already aware of it, but if she does not, then the paper did not 
report the full news. 
352 Id. 
353 Id. at 180–86.  But see ELIZABETH M. PERSE, MEDIA EFFECTS AND SOCIETY 228 
(2001) (“[T]he goal of mass media should be to improve society, not merely to give people 
what they want.”). 
354 DAVID CROTEAU & WILLIAM HOYNES, THE BUSINESS OF MEDIA: CORPORATE 
MEDIA AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 107–09 (2d ed. 2006). 
355 POTTER, supra note 350, at 182. 
356 Id. 
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audiences.357  Often, unusual and sensational news stories draw 
audiences.358  Recent commentary has discussed the media trend 
toward gossip, celebrities, and sensationalistic stories.359  Story 
formulas are another influence on what the media reports.360  Time 
constraints lead reporters to resort to shortcuts, or story formulas, to 
generate material.361  The reliance on these formulas can skew, or 
even change, the way the public perceives the story.362 
2.  What the Media Reports 
The media’s choice of what to report is often largely determinative 
of what receives public attention.363  Media outlets tend to report on 
risks that reporters and editors already deem to be of interest to the 
public.364  The initial determination is a key factor in determining 
what news reaches the public.  The media tend to focus on risks that 
kill or injure numerous people at a single time as opposed to risks that 
have a cumulative effect over a longer time span, such as a year.365  
Routine sources of danger and common risks are less newsworthy.  
Catastrophes and unusual risks are novel and imminently sellable.366  
The amount of time it takes for an event to unfold, or to occur, also 
 
357 Id. at 185. 
358 PERSE, supra note 353, at 39. 
359 KELLI S. BURNS, CELEB 2.0: HOW SOCIAL MEDIA FOSTER OUR FASCINATION WITH 
POPULAR CULTURE (“[C]elebrity reporting has become an accepted part of the news, with 
the antics of celebrities showing up in venerable mainstream media outlets . . . .”); see also 
POTTER, supra note 350, at 107 (noting that people like deviance from the norm).  
Because of this, the news media are more interested in presenting stories that are 
deviations than those that fall within the realm of “normal,” because they are considered to 
be more newsworthy. 
360 POTTER, supra note 350, at 110. 
361 See id. at 103.  Judges and legal practitioners have had to develop methods for 
dealing with the fallout from media sound bites and skew.  See LIEVE GIES, LAW AND THE 
MEDIA: THE FUTURE OF AN UNEASY RELATIONSHIP 8 (2008) (referring to the legal 
system’s “extraordinary institutional resilience and its ability to take on its media 
detractors”). 
362 POTTER, supra note 350, at 110–11.  An example of a story formula is the series of 
questions: Who? What? Where? When? Why? and How?  Another story formula is called 
the inverted pyramid.  In this structure a journalist places the most important information 
at the beginning of the story and then progressively moves on to information of less 
importance. 
363 See Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 98. 
364 Edward S. Herman, The Media and Markets in the United States, in THE RIGHT TO 
TELL: THE ROLE OF MASS MEDIA IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 61, 62–64 (2002). 
365 Emma Hughes et al., The Media and Risk, in RISK IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 250, 253 
(Peter Taylor-Gooby & Jens O. Zinn eds., 2006). 
366 Id. at 255. 
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plays an important role in how newsworthy a story is.367  For 
example, environmental degradation, such as worsening water quality 
and deforestation, is less likely to make it into the news than a single 
environmental disaster, such as a tsunami, hurricane, or massive 
flooding.368  Another factor important to determining what 
information will make it into the media is whether there is a human 
angle to the story.369  Personal accounts are particularly likely to 
engage the audience.370  News stories that focus on the trials of a 
single person are also more likely to contain salient details, making 
the story easily recalled and recounted.371 
While reporters seek out compelling subject matter, story content is 
not the only consideration.  The types of sources available also 
influence which stories the media reports.  The media tend to favor 
official sources, as opposed to alternative sources, and to engage in 
relatively little independent investigation to substantiate information 
from these sources, as opposed to the investigation conducted to 
verify information provided by an alternative source.372  When the 
story involves a crisis, such as a natural disaster, the media is 
particularly likely to favor official sources.  After most of the fallout 
from a crisis has passed, the media tend to become more critical of the 
sources they have used.373  Another factor influencing which sources 
gain access to the media is a source’s resources.  Greater resources 
allow certain sources of information to access the media disparately.  
Well-heeled sources not only gain initial access to media outlets, but 
also they often outlast any opposition with fewer resources.374 
 
367 Id.  This immediacy bias is reflected not only in consumer preferences but also in 
legislative responses to harms.  One example is involuntary civil commitment 
requirements for the mentally ill, which specify that prior to commitment there must be a 
demonstration that due to mental illness the subject is an immediate danger to self or 
others.  See, e.g., UTAH CODE ANN. § 62A-5-312(3)(a) (2011) (indicating that the subject 
must manifest “an immediate danger of physical injury to self or others” (emphasis 
added)); ALA. CODE § 22-52-10.4(a)(ii) (1997) (requiring proof that “respondent poses a 
real and present threat of substantial harm to self and/or others”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.16 § 
5001 (1996). 
368 Hughes et al., supra note 365; see also Herman, supra note 364. 
369 See Hughes et al., supra note 365, at 256. 
370 See id. 
371 See id. 
372 Id. at 253. 
373 See id. at 254. 
374 Id.  An example of this was silicone breast implants in the 1990s.  At first, media 
coverage focused on health risks and testimonials from women who had complications.  
As time passed, the leading manufacturer of breast implants, Corning, was able to take 
advantage of its resources and public relations officials.  Later coverage was then 
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The geological, cultural, or political focus of the reporter or media 
outlet also influences that which it deems newsworthy.  Members of 
the media are particularly likely to report events that are of particular 
personal, cultural, or political relevance to its audience.375  Some 
have noted that the public’s apparent obsession with celebrities often 
influences reporting choices.  Risks that impact celebrities or public 
figures receive greater attention than they would otherwise.376  While 
the media are particularly interested in some kinds of subject matter, 
there are certain types of stories reporters are careful to avoid.  Some 
threats are categorized as unpalatable and are rarely (or gingerly) 
reported.  For instance, the media is much more likely to report the 
murder or sexual assault of a child when the perpetrator is a stranger, 
as opposed to a family member.377  Hence, although the incidence of 
violence against women and children is much higher at the hands of 
family members, media reports would lead to the conclusion that 
stranger attacks are more frequent.378 
3.  The Media as Facilitator: Social Amplification and Availability 
Cascades 
When an event with negative effects occurs, it can serve as a 
signal, portending future harm.379  However, the degree to which the 
event assumes significance for risk perception varies widely.380  The 
media’s portrayal of a particular signal can profoundly influence the 
 
dominated by assurances by the industry that breast implants were safe.  See, e.g., The 
MacNeil/Lehrer NewsHour (PBS television broadcast Sept. 13, 1995); Gina Kolata, New 
Study Finds No Link Between Implants and Illness, N.Y. TIMES, June 22, 1995, at A18. 
375 Hughes et al., supra note 365, at 256. 
376 Id. at 257. 
377 Id. 
378 Id. (stating that many more children are killed by the hands of their mothers or 
fathers each year than by strangers); see also Molly J. Walker Wilson, An Evolutionary 
Perspective on Male Violence: Practical and Policy Implications, 32 AM. J. CRIM. L. 291, 
293 (2005). 
379 Pidgeon, supra note 60 (“As a key part of [the] communication process, risk events 
and their characteristics become portrayed through various risk signals (images, signs, and 
symbols) which in turn interact with a wide range of psychological, social, institutional or 
cultural processes in ways that intensify or attenuate perceptions of risk.”). 
380 Kasperson & Kasperson, supra note 18, at 96 (“[T]he human experience of risk is 
simultaneously an experience of potential harm and the ways by which institutions and 
people process and interpret these threats.”  Risk analysis “requires an approach that is 
capable of illuminating risk in its full complexity[ and] is sensitive to the social settings in 
which risk occurs” while recognizing “that social interactions may either amplify or 
attenuate the signals to society about the risk.”). 
WILSON 10/28/2011  10:35 AM 
186 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90, 113 
significance to the public of that signal.381  In this role, the media acts 
as an amplification station for the information.  There are four ways 
in which amplification stations may increase the social amplification 
of a risk: volume, whether the information is disputed, the extent to 
which the information is dramatized, and the symbolic connotations 
to the information.382  After an amplification station sends out 
information and a listener receives it, the information can then be 
amplified again resulting in behavioral responses creating secondary 
effects and possibly third-order effects.  These are ripple effects.383 
In a first-order effect, a large volume of information flow about a 
particular risk can serve to amplify the perception of risk.  In a 
second-order effect, extensive coverage of a particular event may 
result in increased attention from the public, which may, in turn, 
result in additional media focus.384  To the extent that the risk is 
debated, resulting uncertainty can increase public anxiety.385  
Moreover, sensationalistic accounts of an event, designed to increase 
interest, can serve to heighten concern.  Sensational news stories 
generally rely on vivid reenactments or recounts, which increase 
awareness and memory for the event long after initial exposure.386  
Finally, facilitators and the media both use symbolic language 
designed to heighten drama, and the use of such language can result 
in further amplification of risk perception.387 
The importance of memorable and emotionally relevant stimuli for 
risk perception is critical to understanding the effect of the media in 
public risk response.388  A death from an event such as an airplane 
crash is 6000 times more likely to be reported by the media than 
someone dying from cancer, although the risk of death from air travel 
is far less than the risk from cancer.389  The media also frequently 
increase coverage about events that occur with declining frequency, 
while decreasing coverage about events that are increasing in 
 
381 See Lynn J. Frewer et al., The Media and Genetically Modified Foods: Evidence in 
Support of the Social Amplification of Risk, 22 RISK ANALYSIS 701, 702 (2002). 
382 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 184 (providing a detailed description of this ripple 
effect and a visual representation of this phenomenon). 
383 Id. at 182, 183 fig.2 (same). 
384 Id. at 184; see also Frewer et al., supra note 381 (providing contrasting examples of 
how the volume of information can influence the social amplification of risk). 
385 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 184. 
386 Id. at 184–85. 
387 Id. at 185. 
388 SUNSTEIN, supra note 185, at 33–35. 
389 Hughes et al., supra note 365, at 250. 
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frequency.  For example, media coverage of salmonella poisoning 
incidents is decreasing even though the number of incidents is on the 
rise.390  Similarly, the number of stories reporting on dangers posed 
by environmental pollutants is increasing, while pollution levels are 
declining.391  The media can mislead members of the public, 
amplifying fear about some risks, while attenuating concerns over 
other risks.392 
In many ways, the media is a fitting note upon which to conclude 
this Article.  So much of the risk perception story is affected by 
communication through media channels: Internet, television, 
newspaper, magazines, radio.393  Although the members of the public 
interpret information through their own lenses, the manner in which 
the media frames the risk issue or debate unquestionably has 
enormous effects on initial evaluations, and often these effects are 
lasting.  Moreover, nonmedia sources often use the media to control 
the hearts and minds of Americans.394 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has argued that the current dearth of understanding 
about how individuals evaluate and assess risk is a serious problem 
from the perspective of managing risk and public reactions to risk 
events.  Policy makers often fail to systematically consider citizens’ 
views on risks prior to making risk decisions.  Lack of public input is 
problematic because, as scholars have noted, resource allocation is 
never value-neutral—particularly when risk management is 
concerned.395  For example, environmental law scholar Donald 
Hornstein asserts that “the substance of modern environmental law is 
a composite of moral decisions—about the levels of protection to be 
accorded such noncommodity values as human health, aesthetics, and 
responsibility toward nonhuman species and ecosystems—and 
instrumental decisions about the best way to achieve these morally 
 
390 Id. 
391 Id. 
392 Kasperson et al., supra note 1, at 185. 
393 Wahlberg & Sjöberg, supra note 147 (noting that, regardless of extent, it is 
undeniable that media does play a role in public risk perception). 
394 See Francesco Sobbrio, Indirect Lobbying and Media Bias 1 (March 2009) 
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Southern California), available at 
http://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/18215/1/MPRA_paper_18215.pdf (asserting that, behind 
the scenes, lobbyists indirectly control and bias the media in their favor). 
395 See generally Kahan, supra note 26. 
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based goals.”396  All risk decisions involve judgments about the most 
appropriate way to balance benefits against costs, allocate resources, 
and distribute hazard potentials; hence, such decisions often implicate 
complex and value-laden questions about equality and fairness.397 
Although there is debate about how to manage risk––and who 
should manage it––there ought not be any dispute as to the necessity 
of a comprehensive public risk perception model.  The need for a 
better understanding of how risk information is received and 
evaluated is manifest in data collected from survey studies on 
individual attitudes about risk.  Renowned risk researcher Paul Slovic 
notes that 
Another consistent result from psychometric studies of expressed 
preferences is that people tend to view current risk levels as 
unacceptably high for most activities.  The gap between perceived 
and desired risk levels suggests that people are not satisfied with the 
way that market and other regulatory mechanisms have balanced 
risks and benefits.”398 
If risk decisions are to well serve the public, the decisions must be 
crafted with some understanding of the needs and desires of the 
human beings who are at risk. 
The mandate for getting a handle on public risk perception is so 
profound that it has served as a primary impetus for risk perception 
research to date.  Risk analysts—as members of society and the 
human race—have a critical role to play in risk policy.  Judgments of 
risk analysts, however, have limited value on their own.  Because 
experts are not outside of the cultural milieu, they, like others, are 
influenced by inevitable cognitive patterns, emotion-based responses, 
and political and moral concerns.399  Expert analysis and opinion 
should be informed by careful consideration of the preferences of lay 
members of the public. 
This Article draws on prior empirical and theoretical work to 
develop a comprehensive model of public risk perception that can 
 
396 See Hornstein, supra note 24, at 631. 
397 See, e.g., ROGER E. KASPERSON ET AL., EQUITY ISSUES IN RADIOACTIVE WASTE 
MANAGEMENT 331 (Robert E. Kasperson ed., 1983). 
398 Slovic, supra note 8, at 283 (emphasis added). 
399 See Baruch Fischhoff et al., Defining Risk, 17 POL’Y SCI. 123, 124 (1984) (“No 
definition [of risk] is advanced as the correct one, because there is no one definition that is 
suitable for all problems.  Rather, the choice of definition is a political one, expressing 
someone’s views regarding the importance of different adverse effects in a particular 
situation.  Such determinations should not be the exclusive province of scientists, who 
have no special insight into what society should value.”). 
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assist risk managers and inspire future discussion about the role of 
individual citizens in risk decisions.  Included in this analysis is not 
only a discussion of how the characteristics of a risk influence 
citizens’ views, but also about how perceptions of risk are influenced 
by features of the communication context, neutral and non-neutral 
communicators, characteristics of any relevant subpopulation at risk, 
and cultural factors, among other considerations.  The compilation of 
factors presented in this Article is designed not only to serve as a 
starting point for fresh consideration of how hazards ought to be 
managed, but also it is presented as a model for predicting public risk 
response.  Significant implications follow.  Public panics may be 
legitimate, or they may be more harmful than they are helpful.400  
Some communication campaigns may be timely and informative, yet 
others may help to fuel a perfect storm, creating unnecessary anxiety 
and wasted effort.401  With heightened awareness of the social and 
cultural factors that drive risk assessment, lawmakers can better 
manage risks and address public risk responses proactively. 
  
 
400 See, e.g,, Albert M. Rosenblatt, Under Stress: The Constitution in Times of National 
Ordeal, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 143, 145 (2009) (discussing 9/11 and the USA PATRIOT 
Act); Dara L. Schottenfeld, Witches and Communists and Internet Sex Offenders, Oh My: 
Why It Is Time to Call Off the Hunt, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 359, 359 (2008) (discussing 
the Salem witch trial panic in relation to modern day “witch hunts” involving Internet sex 
offenders). 
401 For example, the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (DARE) is a helpful campaign.  
See DRUG ABUSE RESISTANCE EDUCATION, ABOUT D.A.R.E., http://www.dare.com 
/home/default.asp (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).  Conversely, Bert the Turtle during the 
Cold War was needless and anxiety producing.  nuclearvault,  Duck and Cover (1951) Bert 
the Turtle Civil Defense Film, YOUTUBE (July 11, 2009), http://www.youtube.com 
/watch?v=IKqXu-5jw60. 
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